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CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
Introduction 
The goal of the swine industry is to profitably produce a consistent, high quality, 
wholesome, safe product.  According to data from the USDA Foreign Agricultural Service in 
2008, pork is the world’s most widely eaten meat compromising 40% of the meat consumed 
worldwide.  The U.S. is the second largest pork producing country in the world, after China.  
In 2009, approximately 10,446,000 metric tons of pork, 10% of the world’s production, was 
produced in the U.S.  However, the U.S. swine industry has undergone dramatic changes in 
the last two decades.  Some of these changes have included a declining number of producers, 
increasing herd sizes, increasing sow productivity and farm specialization. In addition, 
emerging or re-emerging diseases have been recognized.  
With changes in the structure of the swine industry there have also been changes in 
the roles of swine veterinarians.  Swine veterinarians today focus more on preventive 
medicine and improving overall herd health rather than responding after disease occurs, the 
latter common in traditional “fire engine” practices of 20 years ago.  Swine veterinarians now 
have a proactive role in anticipating problems and preventing disease while a responsibility 
to provide care to each pig. This is a challenge as resources (money and labor) are becoming 
more and more limited.  Consequently, swine veterinarians are highly motivated to be 
innovative by utilizing modern technology, epidemiologic principals, biostatistics and 
improved diagnostic methods to better guide them through the prioritization and allocation of 
resources to improve the health and welfare of pigs. 
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One of the challenges of swine veterinary practice is that technology and disease 
diagnostics evolve at a faster pace than the knowledge can be applied. Considerable effort is 
required to allow for full interpretation of the clinical meaning and implications of new 
diagnostic tools.  Research advancements and detection methods provide veterinarians the 
diagnostic tools to seek and detect the presence of “new” agents (porcine circovirus type 2, 
Torque teno virus genogroups 1 & 2, influenza A virus, etc.).  A dilemma emerges when 
“new” agent(s) are detected but the context and clinical significance are not known. The 
question that follows is: So what now? 
 Historically, veterinarians often would look for a single pathogen and then interpret 
all of the clinical findings or pathology based on the presence or absence of the pathogen of 
interest.  This process can lead veterinarians to over-attribute significance of a particular 
pathogen, or perhaps under-attribute the significance of others.  A good example is the 
identification of porcine circovirus type 2 (PCV2) in the U.S. swine population.  In the late 
1990s, a new technology for serologic testing for specific antibody for PCV2 was developed; 
this tool allowed veterinarians to test for PCV2 infection. Many veterinarians in the field 
seized the opportunity to test for yet another “new” agent. The test results consistently 
demonstrated that most, if not all, pigs tested positive for PCV2.  What did that mean?  Was 
this a real pathogen?  We now know the rest of the story as the Canadian and U.S. swine 
industries suffered a major disease epidemic with severe economic and welfare consequences 
starting in 2005 with the introduction of a new subtype of PCV2.  The swine industry was not 
prepared. 
Ironically, veterinarians in the U.S. swine industry did not give credence to the 
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occurrence of a severe disease epidemic which occurred in Europe in early 2000s. The 
Europeans described a post-weaning multisystemic wasting syndrome (PMWS) and 
associated it with PCV2. Because a lack of experience with PMWS and over-confidence in 
the new PCV2 serology technology, veterinarians in the U.S. ascribed the European disease 
experience to their pig-rearing methods or other diseases rather than a vigilant 
acknowledgement of an emerging viral infection. The U.S. swine industry and veterinarians 
had a diagnostic tool to diagnose an infection but it was not well-understood and, 
consequently, ignored a real threat through over-confidence in a limited technology. 
Technology had outpaced our knowledge.  United States veterinarians were still thinking 
within a framework of Koch’s postulates and failed to recognize variation in virulence. The 
concepts of variation and accumulated evidence were not given serious consideration. 
Swine veterinarians are not only concerned about pig health and welfare, but also 
need to be vigilant for issues that impact human health. Concerns are not only from a food 
safety standpoint, but also regarding public health and worker safety.  The “industrialization” 
of livestock production occurred simultaneously with fewer people engaged in agriculture. 
Uninformed, often urban, populations become disconnected from agriculture and modern 
production methods.  The lack of understanding and misinformation of news reports creates 
the sense that the consolidation of animal agriculture is causing more public health concerns.  
One of these is the concern that pigs can serve as the mixing vessel for influenza A viruses 
(IAV).  Before 2009, the fear was that the next pandemic flu was going emerge from pigs 
and that the Midwest was at high risk because of the large concentration of pigs.  There were 
also fears that the raising of large number of pigs in a small area would also promote the 
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development and propagation of a new pandemic strain of IAV. To date, there is little 
evidence to substantiate these fears and beliefs. 
All veterinarians take an oath which states: “Being admitted to the profession of 
veterinary medicine, I solemnly swear to use my scientific knowledge and skills for the 
benefit of society through the protection of animal health and welfare, the prevention and 
relief of animal suffering, the conservation of animal resources, the promotion of public 
health, and the advancement of medical knowledge.”  Public health is a veterinarian’s 
responsibility bound by oath. In practice this means veterinarians need to understand public 
concerns, issues or implications and take a proactive role. This is not without challenges in 
implementation or interpretation. The example of the recent pandemic IAV illuminates 
concerns at multiple levels. If pandemic IAV is found in swine, is it a threat for workers? 
What is the impact of detection on ability to market swine? How will regulators, public 
health officials and the public react to bits of information that may not have context? Indeed, 
there are risks to detecting agents or infections without context to accurately interpret impact 
or consequences.   
On the other hand, a veterinarian’s oath is “to use scientific knowledge and skills for 
the benefit of society through the protection of animal health and welfare”; that is, if there is 
something important to find then we (veterinarians and swine industry) need to find it.  
Swine veterinarians value scientific information. Swine veterinarians are proactive in 
research in academic settings and in the field which allows continuous improvement of 
understanding through proper design of trials and correct interpretation of the significance of 
the findings. Ultimately, this will lead to a better understanding of intervention steps which 
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can help mitigate or ameliorate identified areas of concern.  The goal is not just to find 
something, but rather find something and figure out what to do about it. 
The most economically severe of all swine diseases, porcine reproductive and 
respiratory syndrome virus (PRRSV), continues to plague swine world-wide. Swine 
veterinarians lost some of their credibility with swine producers in the mid-1990s because, 
once again, technology outsmarted us.  Initially, veterinarians classified herds as either 
positive or negative and matched herd health status based on a simple “yes or no.”  Serology 
was used to identify which animals were infected and/or shedding virus versus those animals 
which presumably had sterilizing immunity, were not infected, and posed no risk to the rest 
of the herd.  The repeated failure of diagnostic testing to accurately predict outcomes in the 
field compromised perceptions of profession competence.  Today, based on ongoing 
discovery and research, swine veterinarians change tests, test strategies and interpretation in 
order to adapt to new knowledge and new situations. Concepts long-engrained in swine 
producers must also be changed based on new research findings.  Although swine producers 
are right to question what swine veterinarians do, the profession remains committed to 
seeking and providing solutions for the elusive PRRSV.  
Dr. Calvin Schwabe, in 1982, wrote an editorial in Preventive Veterinary Medicine 
which he labeled the lack of "economically and scientifically viable approaches to the new 
practice of intensive livestock production" as a "crisis" for preventive veterinary medicine.  
Perhaps recognizing the complexity of the health dynamic involved, he envisioned a future in 
which veterinary practice would be "a form of on-going on-farm research based upon 
surveillance ...." Yet, he was not privy to innovations yet to come. 
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In human diagnostic medicine, oral fluid specimens collected using simple, non-
invasive procedures are used for the detection of a wide variety of infectious agents, 
hormones, toxins, and drugs.  It was a stroke of ingenuity and innovation which allowed a 
team of researchers at Iowa State University (Zimmerman lab) to explore the application of 
this “new” diagnostic specimen in swine populations.  The ease of collection and diagnostic 
value of specimens collected in this manner has provided increasing momentum for adoption. 
Recent research has shown that oral fluid specimens can be used to monitor the circulation of 
PRRSV, PCV2 and IAV in swine populations using polymerase chain reaction (PCR) assays.  
Oral fluid is increasingly being used to measure specific antibodies as surrogate for serum. 
This is providing veterinarians with valuable and practical tools with which to economically 
capture a large amount of information that can help us better understand pathogen excretion 
patterns and thus better understand disease ecology and transmission dynamics.  
As veterinarians build on the knowledge and experience of the past and the 
increasingly complex technologies and innovations, basic concepts and questions must 
remain at the forefront. We need to obtain a better understanding of pathogen transmission 
(especially within-herd transmission) so that proper intervention practices may be 
developed and implemented mitigating exposure or the consequences of exposure (biological 
risk management).  Preventive veterinary medicine is the key!  To achieve this, it does 
require the development of newer and better technology practices that can maximize 
information collection more efficiently and cost effectively.  As these new technologies 
become available (oral fluid surveillance), we will all need better training in the 
methodology and statistical interpretation of interactions with multiple infectious agents and 
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risk factors over time.  This all needs to be done while still ensuring our industry continues to 
produce wholesome and safe food, provides for the welfare of animals, and ensures the safety 
of workers (zoonosis).  
 
Dissertation Organization 
This dissertation is prepared in an alternate manuscript format.  It is composed of six 
chapters including the introduction, three separate scientific manuscripts, a literature review, 
and a general conclusion.  One of the manuscripts has been published, one has been 
submitted, and one will be submitted with the intent for all of these chapters to be published 
in refereed scientific journals. The last chapter that includes the literature review has been 
submitted for peer review and is intended to be published on-line but not through a scientific 
journal.  The Ph.D. candidate, Alejandro Ramirez is the primary author of all the manuscripts 
described. 
The first manuscript describes the detection of possible transmission IAV from pigs 
to swine confinement workers and associated risk factors for seroconversion.  This 
manuscript was published in the Emerging Infectious Diseases journal.  The second 
manuscript estimates the within-herd rate of transmission of PRRSV and associated risk 
factors.  This paper will be submitted for publication in the Journal of Swine Health and 
Production.  The third manuscript proposes a new model for using oral fluid samples to 
monitor pig populations over time, more frequently, and efficiently.  This paper has been 
submitted to Preventive Veterinary Medicine for publication consideration.  The final paper 
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summarizes the current knowledge and understanding regarding biosecurity principles in 
swine operations and introduces the concept of biological risk management focused on routes 
of transmission.  This paper has been submitted to the National Pork Board for peer review 
and future publication and dissemination to the swine industry (veterinarians and producers).  
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CHAPTER 2. PREVENTING ZOONOTIC INFLUENZA VIRUS 
INFECTION  
A paper published in 
Emerging Infectious Diseases 12:997-1000, 2006 
 
 
Alejandro Ramirez, Ana W. Capuano, Debbie A. Wellman, Kelly Lesher,  
Sharon F. Setterquist, and Gregory C. Gray 
  
 
 
 
Abstract 
We evaluated 49 swine workers and 79 non-exposed controls for antibodies to swine 
influenza viruses. Multivariate modeling revealed that workers who seldom used gloves 
(OR=30.3) or who smoked (OR=18.7) were at highest risk of having evidence of previous 
H1N1 swine virus. These findings have value in pandemic influenza planning. 
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Introduction 
In the United States alone, influenza viruses are estimated to annually cause 36,000 
human deaths and 200,000 hospitalizations [1-5].  The current outbreaks of avian influenza 
in Asia and Eastern Europe remind us of the potential for these viruses to be zoonotic.  As 
swine express sialic acids that can serve as receptors for swine, human, and avian influenza 
strains they are important in cross-species influenza transmission and the genesis of novel 
influenza strains.  Previously reported human-to-swine and swine-to-human influenza 
transmission illustrate this potential [6,7].   
Individuals who work in enclosed livestock buildings (confinement workers) are 
among the human populations with the highest risk of swine influenza virus infection.  Their 
work involves close contact with large numbers of swine, and the frequent handling of sick 
pigs.  The purpose of this cross-sectional study was to learn if these workers had evidence of 
previous swine influenza virus infection, and if so, to determine risk factors which cause 
them to be at infection risk.   
The Study 
Iowa is the United States’ number one swine-producing state, marketing an estimated 
25 million hogs a year.  From November 2004 to March 2005, we recruited confinement 
workers.  Site selection was based upon the authors’ community contacts and opportunities to 
invite confinement workers to participate.  Local veterinary clinics helped advertise the study 
and permitted enrollment at their facilities.  This study was approved by the University of 
11 
 
  
Iowa’s institutional review board. 
Workers were eligible to participate if they had worked in a swine confinement 
within the past 12 months prior to enrollment.  Participants completed a questionnaire and 
permitted sera collection upon enrollment.  The questionnaire captured demographic, 
medical, and occupational data including influenza immunization history, swine occupational 
exposures, and use of protective equipment (gloves and masks). 
Non-exposed controls were enrolled during a concurrent study from among 
University of Iowa faculty, staff, and students [8].     
Serum samples were studied using a hemagglutination inhibition (HI) assay against 
two recently circulating swine and one human influenza virus strains: A/Swine/WI/238/97 
(H1N1), A/Swine/WI/R33F/01 (H1N2) and A/New Caledonia/20/99 (H1N1).  The swine 
H1N1 strain represents a lineage of virus that has been circulating among US swine 
populations for the past 70 years.  The swine H1N2 strain first appeared in the US swine 
populations in 1999.  HI titer results are reported as the reciprocal of the highest dilution of 
serum that inhibited virus-induced hemagglutination of a 0.65% solution of guinea pig red 
blood cells for human influenza and 0.5% solution of turkey red blood cells for swine 
influenza. 
Specimen laboratory results were studied for their statistical association with 
demographic, immunization, occupational, and other behavioral risk factors.  Confinement 
workers were queried regarding the type of confinement work as well as the use of protective 
equipment.  Because higher titers had low or no incidence in most of the population groups, 
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H1N1 titers above 1:10 were grouped.  The resulting categories were <1:10, 1:10, and >1:10.  
Wilcoxon rank sum, as well as Chi-square statistic or two-sided Fisher’s exact test were used 
to access bivariate risk factor associations.  Depending upon the nature of the data and 
modeling assumptions, proportional odds modeling or logistic regression was used to adjust 
for multiple risk factors.  Final multivariate models were designed using a saturated model 
and manual backwards elimination.  Analyses were performed using SAS software version 
9.1 (SAS Institute, Inc., Cary, NC).   
Questionnaires were individually completed by participants and made available in 
both English and Spanish versions.  Site selections were based on personal contacts in three 
completely different geographic areas. 
Results 
Forty-nine confinement workers and 79 non-exposed controls were enrolled in the 
study.  The distribution of ages was similar for the two groups but the confinement workers 
were more likely to be male and Hispanic, and less likely to have received influenza 
vaccination (Table 1).   
Swine confinement workers were categorized by type of confinement work, 
frequency of contact with swine, use of gloves and use of masks.  Among these, the gloves 
use question “When working with sick or diseased swine how often do you wear gloves?” 
explained the most variation in swine H1N1 antibody titers and was included in the best fit 
model.  Workers who never or sometimes use gloves had markedly higher odds of elevated 
titers against swine H1N1 virus (OR=30.3, 95% CI=3.8-243.5) compared to the non-exposed 
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controls (Table 2).  This group was also at statistically significant increased odds when 
compared to the other confinement workers who use gloves most of the time or always 
(OR=12.7, 95% CI=1.1-151.1 – data not shown).  Subjects who reported smoking similarly 
had the highest odds of elevated titers against swine H1N1 virus.   
Multivariate analysis also identified subjects who received the 2003-2004 flu shot as 
having significantly higher odds of elevated titers (1:10) against swine H1N1 virus (Table 
2) as well as swine H1N2 (data not shown).  Although cross-reaction with one of the viruses 
in the 2003-2004 vaccine or a circulating flu virus is a possible explanation, higher titers for 
all vaccinated subjects would have been expected (including controls) but not observed 
(Figure 1).  We postulate this result represents other behavior or health related confounders 
not identified in the questionnaire of this study. 
Conclusions  
In concert with other swine occupational studies [8-10], these data suggest that swine 
confinement workers are at increased risk for zoonotic influenza infection.  However, these 
are some of the some of the first data to evaluate swine confinement workers, and our sample 
size was small, not likely representative of all swine workers, and exposure data were self-
reported.  Confinement workers, in contrast to other swine occupations, have proven to be 
difficult to reach, due to language barriers, on-farm policies regarding visitors (biosecurity 
protocols), and lack of trust in the public health sector. 
Several studies have previously document smoking as a risk factor for human 
influenza virus infection [11-13].  However, we believe our data are the first evidence that 
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smoking also increases the risk of swine influenza virus infections.  We postulate that this 
increased risk may be due to the worker inoculating his or her oral mucosa with swine 
influenza virus after handling pigs. 
More interesting, we posit that this study’s chief unique contribution is the vivid 
evidence that use of gloves during swine confinement work noticeably decreases the risk of 
swine influenza virus infection.  Thus a rather simple personal protective measure might do 
much to reduce swine-to-man virus transmission.  Future larger studies of swine confinement 
workers are needed to validate our findings and to better quantify risk factors for this 
particular population. 
Individual behavior is known to strongly influence influenza virus transmission [5].  
The national strategy for pandemic influenza highlights the importance of worker education 
and emphasizes the responsibilities of individuals in preventing the spread of pandemic virus 
[14].  Should virulent novel zoonotic influenza virus enter swine confinement facilities and 
spread among concentrated swine populations, the impact would be grave.  It thus seems 
imperative that surveillance for zoonotic influenza virus be routinely conducted among 
agricultural workers and that they should be encouraged to use personal protective equipment 
like gloves, to often wash their hands, as well as to avoid smoking in or around swine 
facilities.  Further it seem appropriate that such workers be included in state and federal 
pandemic plans as a high risk group for the receipt of annual influenza vaccines, pandemic 
use of antivirals, and receipt of pandemic vaccine. 
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Tables 
Table 1. Study population characteristics. 
   Study population n (%) 
Variables Total 
Swine 
confinement 
workers 
(n=49) 
No swine 
exposed 
controls 
(n=79) 
Age group (y)    
 29-42 46 15 (30.6) 31 (39.2) 
 <29 40 12 (24.5) 28 (35.4) 
 >42 42 22 (44.9) 20 (25.3) 
 Mean age  40.3 35.3 
Gender*    
 Male 63 37 (75.5) 26 (32.9) 
 Female 65 12 (24.5) 53 (67.1) 
Race*    
 American Indian/ Alaska Native 1 0 (0) 1 (1.3) 
 Asian 2 1 (2) 1 (1.3) 
 African American 18 0 (0) 18 (22.8) 
 Native Hawaiian/Other Pacific Islander 2 0 (0) 2 (2.5) 
 White 105 48 (98) 57 (72.2) 
Ethnicity*    
 Hispanic/Latino 12 10 (21.7) 2 (2.5) 
 Non-Hispanic/Latino 113 36 (78.3) 77 (97.5) 
Served in the military?    
 Yes 12 5 (10.4) 7 (8.9) 
 No 115 43 (89.6) 72 (91.1) 
Take medications that weaken the immune system?    
 Yes 3 2 (4.2) 1 (1.3) 
 No 122 44 (91.7) 78 (98.7) 
 Don't know 2 2 (4.2) 0 (0) 
Have heart or vascular disease?    
 Yes 3 2 (4.2) 1 (1.3) 
 No 124 46 (95.8) 78 (98.7) 
Received the 2003-2004 flu shot?*    
 Yes 43 8 (16.7) 35 (44.3) 
 No 84 40 (83.3) 44 (55.7) 
Received the 1976-1977 flu shot?*    
 Yes 2 1 (2.1) 1 (1.3) 
 No 119 41 (85.4) 78 (98.7) 
 Don't know 6 6 (12.5) 0 (0) 
Smoked 5 or more packs of tobacco product in past year?*    
 Yes 14 9 (18.4) 5 (6.3) 
 No 114 40 (81.6)* 74 (93.7) 
*Significantly different than controls at Į=0.05 
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CHAPTER 3. ESTIMATING WITHIN-HERD TRANSMISSION OF 
PORCINE REPRODUCTIVE AND RESPIRATORY SYNDROME 
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Summary 
Objective: This study was conducted to evaluate the within-herd rate of transmission 
of porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus (PRRSV) and risk factors affecting 
the rate of seroconversion in growing pigs post-weaning.   
Materials and methods: Twenty six barns were selected to participate and 20 pigs per 
barn (for a total of 520 pigs) were housed together in a pen, tagged and tested for PRRSV 
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antibodies for approximately 24 weeks, sampling every two weeks from the time of 
enrollment in the nursery or wean-to-finish building until marketed.  At the start of the 
project, these pigs were also tested for PRSSV circulation using PCR. 
Results:  A total of 101 (22%) pigs were identified to be viremic for PRRSV by PCR 
at enrollment.  The cumulative mean incidence density rate for PRRSV seroconversion for all 
pigs was 2.57 per 100 pig days.  This means that on average, it took pigs 39.0 days (95% CI, 
35.3 to 43.2) from enrollment to seroconvert to PRRSV as detected by ELISA.  On average it 
would take 3.6 bleeding periods (between 7 and 8 weeks) from when the first pig in a group 
was identified to have seroconverted until the last pig in the group seroconverted.  Cox 
proportional hazard multivariate modeling identified enrollment PRRSV PCR positive result 
(HR=34.0, 95%CI 8.06 to 143.44) and number of PCR positive pigs in the cohort at 
enrollment (HR=1.66, 95%CI 1.23 to 2.23) as significant risk factors for decreased time-to-
seroconversion. 
Implications: PRRSV is not highly contagious.  The smallest pigs in the group are 
not more likely to be PCR positive or seroconvert to PRRSV sooner than the largest pigs in 
the group.  PRRSV ELISA S/P values at weaning are not a predictor of viremia or time-to-
seroconversion.  Serologic PRRSV homogeneity is dynamic and difficult to achieve even in a 
small group of pigs with constant exposure to each other. 
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Introduction 
Porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus (PRRSV) continues to be 
recognized as the most significant swine disease in North America with an annual impact of 
over $560 million a year.1  Much of the previous research has focused on better 
understanding the epidemiology, transmission, and risk factors associated with PRRSV and 
breeding herds.  As the North American swine industry moves towards PRRSV eradication, 
currently there has been more interest in better understanding the dynamics of PRRSV 
transmission post weaning.  Holck and Polson2 reported the average cost of PRRSV in 
growing pigs to range between $6.25-15.25 per pig.  Neumann et al1 attributed 35.9% and 
52.2% of the annual swine industry losses to the nursery and growing phases of production 
respectively with losses due to increased mortality, lower average daily gain and decreased 
feed efficiency.  With over 22 years since PRRSV was first reported in the field,3,4,5 the 
epidemiology and dynamics of viral transmission are still not fully understood.  
Once a herd is infected with PRRSV it tends to circulate within a herd perpetuated by 
a cycle of transmission from dam to her pigs, then by pig-to-pig contact at later stages of 
production. Under field conditions in which susceptible and infectious pigs are mixed, a large 
proportion of the contact population may become infected. Thus, Dee and Joo6 reported 80 to 
100% of pigs in 3 swine herds were infected by 8 to 9 weeks-of-age and Maes7 found 96% of 
market hogs from 50 herds to be sero-positive.  Regional evaluation of PRRSV antibodies 
conducted in swine at slaughter from 2005 – 2008 has consistently identified over 2/3 of pigs 
as seropositive for PRRSV.8,9  These data support practitioner’s experiences of dealing with 
high numbers of PRRSV positive finishing pigs in the Midwest implying extensive viral 
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transmission is occurring. 
   Field research has found marked differences in PRRSV transmission rates between 
groups, pens, and even rooms of animals in infected herds. Houben et al10 even found 
transmission to vary within litters, with some littermates seroconverting as early as 6 to 8 
weeks and others as late as 10 to 12 weeks of age with some still free of PRRSV infection by 
the end of the 12 week study period.  Le Potier et al11 found a lack of seroconversion in 
young sows on endemically-infected farms using in-herd gilt replacements, i.e., these 
animals had lived among PRRSV for 10 months or more without becoming infected.   
Results of a large study on PRRSV transmission in nursery pigs in seven commercial swine 
herds identified two distinct patterns of transmission.12  In farms with rapid spread 50% of 
the pigs were infected between 4 and 7 weeks of age and 90% of pigs were infected by 8.5 
weeks of age. In slow spread farms, only 20 to 40% of pigs were infected by the end of the 
nursery phase.12  Difference in infection patterns between close-contact groups have also 
been reported by others.13,14 
There are many studies demonstrating shedding of the PRRSV in oral fluids, semen, 
nasal secretions, urine, mammary secretions, and feces.15,16,11,17,18,19  There have also been 
attempts to quantify the PRRSV minimum infectious dose for intranasal and intramuscular 
administration20 as well as the ID50 dose for oral, nasal, and aerosol routes of 
transmission.21,22  Persistently infected animals, based on testing tonsils, has been 
demonstrated to last for over 150 days23,14 with one study even finding viral RNA at 251 days 
post-infection although the bioassay was negative from both the blood and tonsil samples.24  
The latter study also concluded there was a distinct drop in proportion of animals harboring 
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virus around 3 to 4 months post-inoculation.24  A study conducted in Great Britain in 2003-
2004 identified PRRSV herd  persistence was associated with larger herd (>250 sows), in pig 
dense areas, with repeated introductions of infected animals.25 
When performing field studies with weaned pigs, maternal antibodies complicate the 
interpretation of serological data.26  The role of antibodies, especially maternal antibodies, in 
providing protection against PRRSV is still not fully understood.  There have been 
conflicting reports depending on the parameters measured as well as the outcome 
evaluated.26  Maternal antibodies do seem to be protective, especially when evaluating 
neutralizing antibodies, although not all pigs seem to be protected.27,28  Maternal antibodies 
for PRRSV are usually detectable until 4-10 weeks of age.3,10  A recent study calculated the 
half-life for maternal PRRSV serum neutralizing antibodies to be 3 weeks expecting negative 
pigs by 10.5 weeks of age.29  This also coincides  with other studies identifying 
seroconversion to occur between 6 and 12 weeks of age.3,10 
As calls for regional eradication continue to gain momentum,30 a better understanding 
of PRRSV transmission in the wean-to-finish periods is necessary.  The objective of this 
study was to evaluate the within-herd rate of transmission of porcine reproductive and 
respiratory syndrome virus (PRRSV) and risk factors affecting the rate of seroconversion for 
growing post-weaning pigs. 
Materials and Methods 
Experimental procedures used in this study were approved by the Iowa State 
University Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee (4-05-5869-S). 
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A multi-site, prospective study was performed involving repeated sampling (nursery 
through market) of a cohort of pigs at multiple barns.  A total of 26 barns were initially 
enrolled and 20 pigs per barn were individually tagged for a total of 520 pigs. The barns were 
sought based on personal contacts and selected on: a) known history of PPRSV 
seroconversion, b) willingness to participate in the study, and c) proximity to resources to 
collect blood samples reliably. Pigs were selected from each barn based on convenience with 
the requirement that the study cohort pigs had to be penned together throughout the study.   
Barn characteristics were collected at enrollment included number of sow farms 
commingled in nursery (by room, barn, and site), whether they practiced all-in-all-out 
between groups (by room, barn, and site), total number of pigs (in room, barn, and site), 
minimum and maximum age of pigs at enrollment (in room, barn, and site), and average 
number of pigs per pen. 
Study pigs were individually weighed at enrollment by using a commercially 
available, battery operated, digital scale.  Pigs were later categorized within a barn (cohort) 
based on their initial weight as follows: SMALLEST (lightest 7 pigs), MIDDLE (middle 6 
pigs), and LARGEST (heaviest 7 pigs). 
Serum samples were collected at enrollment and thereafter every 2 weeks until pigs 
were sent to market.  Serum samples were submitted to the Iowa State University Veterinary 
Diagnostic Laboratory for testing.  All samples were tested shortly after collecting in order to 
provide results back to the barn veterinarians in a timely manner.  All samples were tested for 
antibodies against PRRSV virus using a commercial enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay 
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(ELISA) kit and protocol (HerdCheck ® 2XR, IDEXX, Westbrook, Maine, USA).  Results 
were recorded as serum-to-positive (S/P) values, positive or negative based on the 
manufacturer’s recommended cutoff (0.4 00 is positive), as well as categorically based on 
S/P value into: NEGATIVE (<0.400), LOW (0.400 to 0.999), MEDIUM (1.000 to 1.999), 
and HIGH (2.000) as previously described.31  All initial serum samples were also tested for 
PRRSV viremia via reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (PCR) using a 
commercially available kit (Tetracore Inc., Rockville, MD, USA) as previously described.32 
A specific ELISA serial number (kit 1) had been reserved for testing all study 
samples.  Unfortunately due to a logistic issue it was necessary to switch to a second serial 
number (kit 2) approximately half way through the study.  The timing of the use of kit 2 was 
selected to coincide with the enrollment of the last 10 barns to minimize effects of the 
transition.  A subset of 90 previously collected samples were selected for kit agreement 
comparisons based on convenience and ensuring variability in S/P values.  This subset of 
samples was then tested at the same time using both kits.  Test agreement was assessed as 
described by Bland and Altman.33  In brief, PRRSV EELISA S/P values were transformed 
using natural log and paired sample t-test was performed.  A Bland-Altman plot33 was also 
created by plotting the average of both kit’s log transformed ELISA S/P value for each 
sample (x-axis) by the actual difference in the  log transformed ELISA S/P values obtained 
for each sample (y-axis).  
Seroconversion was defined as the first time when an increase from negative titers to 
a positive titer (S/P 0.4) was detected and maintained for at least 2 consecutive periods.  For 
pigs that did not have a recorded negative sample (i.e. possible maternal antibodies) 
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seroconversion was defined as the first change in S/P values resulting in an upward trend that 
was maintained for at least 2 consecutive periods.34  ELISA S/P results for each pig were 
examined manually to identify the time of seroconversion using the above definitions. 
For pigs to be considered in the final analysis the barn had to meet the following three 
inclusion criteria which was established before any barns were enrolled in the study: 
1. All pigs in the study cohort had to have been kept together in a single pen 
throughout the entire study period (nursery and finishing). 
2. Pigs could not have been vaccinated for PRRSV. 
3. At least one pig in the cohort (barn) had to demonstrate exposure to PRRSV 
by seroconverting at some point during the study period. 
 Incidence density rates (IDR) were computed for each barn individually as well as a 
cumulative rate for all barns combined to allow for the comparison of event rates amongst 
barns including differences in pen characteristics.  The IDR were calculated by taking the 
number of pigs in the group that seroconverted to PRRSV during the study period and 
dividing it by the sum of all individual pig-days until seroconversion was detected for each 
pig in the group.  The 95% CI were calculated using OpenEpi® Version 2.3 (available at 
www.openepi.com).35  
Kaplan-Meier survival curves for time-to-seroconversion were calculated using JMP® 
Version 8.0 (SAS® Institute Inc., Cary, NC, USA) for variables of interest.  The log-rank test 
was used to identify differences between groups since censored data was included.  Survival 
analyses were performed to study the effects of explanatory factors on time-to-
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seroconversion by using Cox regression models using SAS® Version 9.2 (SAS® Institute 
Inc., Cary, NC, USA). Explanatory variables evaluated are listed in Table 1.  Both univariate 
and multivariate regression analyses were performed. An interaction variable with time was 
created for enrollment variables that could change over time by using the natural log 
transformation of the time-to-seroconversion.  A stepwise forward procedure was applied for 
multivariate Cox regression model selection. A robust sandwich covariance matrix estimate 
was used to account for the dependence within site to maximize partial likelihood estimates 
under an independent working assumption to account for the intracluster dependence.  For all 
statistical analysis, significance level was set at Į = 0.05. 
Results 
Herds and serology 
A total of 26 barns (520 pigs) were enrolled in the study from farms that expected 
pigs to seroconvert to PRRSV.  Barns were sampled between September 2005 and September 
2006.  A total of 3 (12%) barns were excluded from analysis due to unexpected events which 
resulted in them not meeting our pre-determined inclusion criteria described above.  Two 
barns were excluded as unexpectedly all pigs (n=40) stayed seronegative though the entire 
study period.  One barn was excluded as all pigs were inadvertently vaccinated for PPRSV 
using a modified live commercial vaccine (Table 2).  Table 3 summarizes some general 
characteristics for the study population.  Of the 5,282 samples collected from the 23 barns 
(460 pigs) used in the discussion and analysis, 3,922 (74%) were ELISA positive for PRRSV 
and 1,360 (26%) were negative (Table 4). A total of 101 (22%) pigs were identified to be 
viremic for PRRSV by PCR at enrollment. Figure 1 shows the mean PRRSV ELISA values 
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for study pigs over time.  A total of 33 (7%) pigs died during the study with an additional 6 
(1%) that were unaccounted.  There were 34 (7%) pigs that appeared to have seroconverted 
to PRRSV before enrollment (left censored) and 16 (3%) pigs died before seroconversion 
could be identified (right censored).  Table 5 summarizes censure data for the study.  No 
sampling periods were missed on any of the study cohorts. 
PRSSV ELISA kit comparison 
Of the 23 barns in the study, PRRSV ELISA kit 1 was used exclusively in 2 barns 
(8.7%), kit 2 exclusively in 10 (43.5%), and both kits 1 & 2 in 11 (47.8%) barns.  Manual 
review of the data revealed that there were only 3 (0.7%) pigs who’s timing of 
seroconversion was possibly affected by the kit change.  In all other study pigs either a single 
kit (n=240, 52.2%) was used for their entire period, they had already seroconverted or been 
censored before the kit change occurred (n=191, 41.5%), or they had a well-defined serologic 
pattern that appeared not to be affected by the change (n=26, 5.7%).  Figure 2 shows the 
Bland-Altman agreement plot for the natural log transformation of the ELISA S/P ratios on a 
subset of 90 samples ran simultaneously on both PRRSV ELISA kits 1 and 2.  This 
agreement had a correlation of 0.945 and the mean of the difference was not statistically 
different from zero (P<0.05). 
Incidence density rate and weeks to positive 
A summary of the incidence density rate (IDR) per 100 pig days is provided in Table 
6 sorted from lowest to highest IDR.  The mean IDR for all pigs was 2.57 events per 100 pig 
days.  This means that on average, it took pigs 39.0 days (95% CI, 35.3 to 43.2) from 
enrollment to seroconvert to PRRSV as detected by ELISA.  The overall mean days to 
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seroconversion for all barns ranged from 13.8 (95%CI, 8.9 to 22.5) to 105.0 (95%CI, 67.8 to 
171.8).  Information regarding the number of PRRSV PCR positive pigs at enrollment as 
well as the number of pigs per pen is provided for each barn.  Figures 3 and 4 summarize the 
barn distribution of PCR positive pigs and number of pigs per pen. 
On average it took 3.6 bleeding periods (between 7 and 8 weeks) from when the first 
pig in a group was identified to have seroconverted until the last pig in the group was 
detected to have seroconverted.  The range varied from 2 (4 weeks) to 7 (14 weeks) periods 
(Figure 5). 
Survival analysis 
Three interesting Kaplan-Meier (K-M) survival curves are worth reporting.  The 
survival curves (time-to-seroconversion) for pigs that were PRRSV PCR positive at 
enrollment were significantly different (P<0.001) than those PCR negative (Figure 6).   
Statistical analysis revealed no significant differences (P<0.05) in the survival curves 
between the categorical ranking, within a group, of the pigs based on their enrollment weight 
(Figure 7).  Even when splitting the ranking into 10 different categories, there still was no 
difference in the seroconversion curves between the different groups of pig sizes within a 
barn (data not shown).  Chi squared analysis did not show any statistical association 
(P<0.05) between size of pig and PRRSV PCR result at enrollment.  
Kaplan-Meier survival curves (time-to-seroconversion) for the magnitude of initial 
ELISA S/P value did not show any statistical differences (P<0.05) between all these four 
groups (Figure 8).  At enrollment, there was no statistical association (P<0.05) between any 
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of the PRRSV ELISA categories and PRRSV PCR result.  Multivariate survival analysis 
results using Cox proportional hazards regression are summarized in Table 7.  
Discussion 
This study was designed to specifically target pigs from flows known to be 
seropositive for PRRSV.  This characteristic increased the likelihood that study subjects were 
exposed to homologous PPRSV. The data from this study confirms that usually PRRSV is 
not a rapidly contagious virus.26,36,37  Contagiousness was defined as having a shorter time to 
seroconversion.  A delay in seroconversion could be cause by lack of sufficient viral 
exposure or simply a delay in the immune response.  Currently, ELISA PRRSV 
seroconversion has been reported to be first detected within 10 – 14 days38 with 100% 
seropositive by 14 days post inoculation even when evaluating different PRRSV pathogenic 
strains and inoculation doses.39  This would suggest the delay in seroconversion is more 
likely explained by lack of sufficient exposure rather than by a delay in immune response.  
Our data goes further and provides the range of days to seroconversion (Table 6) observed in 
the barns from our study.   Overall our data show it took just over 5 weeks (39 days, 95% CI 
35.3 to 43.2) for all pigs in a cohort of 20 to seroconvert.  This is quite an impressive 
number, and short confidence interval, considering all barns housed the 20 pigs in the cohort 
together in a single pen so contact time between pigs was frequent.  The average number of 
pigs per pen were 38 indicating that in over half of the study barns we were monitoring over 
50% of the pigs in the pen.  This prolonged period to reach seroconversion can have multiple 
implications in the field setting.   
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As expected, the most significant risk factor contributing to quicker time-to-
seroconversion (hazard) was whether the study pig was identified to be viremic for PRRSV 
at the start of the study which was also evident in the univariate Kaplan-Meier (K-M) 
survival curve in Figure 6.  It is also important to note that the Cox proportional hazard 
multivariate modeling did recognized that the effect of the initial PRRSV PCR result 
declined over time (HR<1).  Besides the individual pig itself being viremic, for every PCR 
positive pig in the cohort at enrollment time the HR of 1.66 (95%CI, 1.23 to 2.23) would 
increase exponentially.  So having three more pigs would provide a mean HR of 1.663 or 
4.57.  The more PCR positive animals in the group, the more likely other pigs will get 
exposed to PRRSV sooner.  The effect of this variable also decreased slightly over time. 
Being the smallest pig is not a disease.  There were no statistical differences in the K-
M survival curves among the different pig sizes within a cohort.  The multivariate Cox 
proportional hazards model also did not show the smallest pigs as having a higher risk for 
seroconversion.  It was the middle sized pigs that did have a statistically significant HR=1.12 
( 95%CI, 1.04 to 1.20) compared to the smallest pigs and HR=1.23 (95%CI, 1.06 to 1.44) 
compared to the largest pigs in the cohort.  Our results also showed that pigs of different 
sizes within a cohort were not more or less likely to be PCR positive for PRRS at enrollment 
than the other sized pigs.  This is in agreement with Cano et al40 in that in the farrowing 
house, piglet weight was not a risk factor for detecting PCR positive pigs. 
In univariate K-M survival analysis, there was no effect of the magnitude of the 
PRRSV ELISA S/P value when categorized as negative, low, medium, or high (Table 7) on 
the rate of seroconversion.  The multivariate Cox proportional hazard model did identify high 
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S/P values (2.000) as protective (delaying seroconversion).  In our study, at enrollment, pig 
ELISA S/P categories were not statistically associated with the pig’s PCR result.  Similar 
results have been reported in older pigs.41 
The HR results for waterer type and space per pig in the nursery are difficult to 
interpret.  For every 1 m2 provided per pig the HR=49.04 (95%CI, 4.78 to 503.41).  The wide 
confidence interval suggests a higher sample size may be needed to refine the magnitude of 
the effect of this variable. It also does not make biological sense that providing more space 
would increase the hazard for seroconversion.  The estimates for waterer type also seem to 
lack power to detect differences between nipple and cup waterers (data not shown) but 
suggest a possible protective effect from nipple waterers.  This is an interesting area that 
should be investigated as reservoir type waters could be doing exactly that, holding virus and 
facilitating its spread.  Further studies need to be done before any conclusions can be 
supported regarding both of these variables. 
Limitations of this study include not being able to determine the exact timing of 
seroconversion as sampling was done in 2 week intervals.  Not all pigs were enrolled at the 
same age, but the selection of survival analysis does allow for this consideration. Ideally it 
would have been better to freeze back all serum samples and run the PRRSV ELISA on all 
samples at the same time.  Unfortunately it was necessary to report results back on a timely 
manner in order to provide value to the herd veterinarian and herd owner who volunteered 
their barns for participation in the study.  The change in ELISA kit serials was not ideal, but 
our analysis and evaluation of the data suggest that its impact was minimal if any (<1% of 
pigs possibly affected).  The study was also not designed to account for PRRSV strain 
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differences and their possible effect on time-to-seroconversion. 
Implications 
x PRRSV virus seems to move relatively slowly in a confined population. 
x The smallest pigs in the group are not more likely to be PCR positive or 
seroconvert to PRRSV sooner than the largest pigs in the group. 
x PRRSV ELISA S/P values (negative, low, medium, or high) at weaning are 
not a predictor of viremia or time-to-seroconversion.   
x Serologic PRRSV homogeneity is dynamic and difficult to achieve even in a 
small group of pigs with constant exposure to each other.  
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1.  Explanatory variables evaluated for possible effect on porcine reproductive and 
respiratory syndrome virus (PRRSV) time-to-seroconversion based on ELISA S/P values 
in a cohort of 20 pigs house together from enrollment in the nursery phase through 
marketing 
Variable description Type 
Pig’s start weight Categorical (SMALLEST, MIDDLE, 
LARGEST) 
Pig’s starting PRRSV ELISA S/P value Categorical (NEGATIVE, LOW, 
MEDIUM, HIGH) 
Pig’s starting PRRSV PCR result Categorical (YES, NO) 
Number of PRRSV PCR positive pigs in cohort Numerical (integer) 
Number of sow farms comingled in the nursery room Numerical (integer) 
Number of sow farms comingled on the site Numerical (integer) 
Age difference of pigs in nursery room Numerical (integer) 
Age difference of pigs on site Numerical (integer) 
Number of pigs per pen in nursery Categorical (SMALL, LARGE) 
Nursery space per pig (m2/pig) Numerical (continuous) 
Nursery waterer type Categorical (CUP, NIPPLE, BOTH) 
Wean-to-finish barn Categorical (YES, NO) 
All-in-all-out by site Categorical (YES, NO) 
 
PRRSV = porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus; ELISA S/P = enzyme-linked 
immunosorbent assay serum-to-positive; PCR = polymerase chain reaction
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Table 2.  Summary of pertinent nursery phase barn characteristics for all 26 barns initially 
enrolled in porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus (PRRSV) longitudinal 
seroconversion study and whether they were included or excluded in the final analysis 
 Excluded
* 
(%) 
Included 
(%) 
Total 
(%) 
Number of barns 3 (11.5) 23 (88.5) 26 
Number of sow farms per barn 1.3 3.3 3.1 
Number of sites practicing AIAO 0 (0) 10 (43.5) 10 (38.5) 
Number of pigs per barn 1,517 2,291 2,201 
Number of wean-to-finish sites 2 (66.7) 16 (69.6) 18 (69.2) 
Average number of pigs per pen 256† 38 63 
Number of large pen barns‡ 2 (66.7) 11 (47.8) 13 (50.0) 
Number of barns with cup waterers 3 (100) 19 (82.6) 22 (84.6) 
Number of barns with nipple waterers 0 (0) 4 (17.4) 4 (15.4) 
 
* Barns were excluded from analysis for the following reasons:  2 barns unexpectedly stayed 
negative for PRRSV for the entire grow-finish period and one barn inadvertently vaccinated 
pigs with a modified live PRRSV vaccine. 
†Number of pigs per pen for the three excluded barns were 612, 123, and 32. 
‡Large pen was defined as 40 or more pigs per pen. 
AIAO = all-in-all-out; PRRSV = porcine reproductive and respiratory virus 
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Table 3.  General enrollment characteristics for 460 pigs (23 barns with 20 pigs per barn) 
used in porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus (PRRSV) longitudinal 
seroconversion study 
 Mean Min Max SD 
Age (days) 27.8 18 43 6.94 
Weight (kg) 7.25 4.13 14.68 1.786 
Initial PRRSV ELISA S/P value* 0.535 0.000 4.146 0.7109 
Initial PCR positive pigs per barn† 4.4 0 13 5.13 
 
*HerdCheck ® 2XR, IDEXX, Westbrook, Maine, USA.  
†Tetracore Inc., Rockville, MD, USA. 
Min = minimum; Max = maximum; SD = standard deviation; PRRSV = porcine reproductive 
and respiratory syndrome virus; ELISA S/P = enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay serum-
to-positive; PCR = polymerase chain reaction 
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Table 4.  Distribution of 460 study pigs (23 cohorts of 20 pigs each) categorized based on 
their starting porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus (PPRSV) ELISA S/P 
values (negative, low, medium, or high) and viremia 
 Negative 
< 0.4000 
Low 
0.400 – 0.999 
Medium 
1.000 – 1.999
High 
 2.000 Total 
 n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) 
ELISA S/P* 284 (61.7) 95 (20.7) 49 (10.7) 32 (7.0) 460 (100) 
PCR positive†  56 (12.2) 23 (5.0) 14 (3.0) 8 (1.7) 101 (22.0) 
 
*HerdCheck ® 2XR, IDEXX, Westbrook, Maine, USA. 
†Tetracore Inc., Rockville, MD, USA - PCR positive results are summarized based on the 
pig’s ELISA S/P value. 
PRRSV = porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus; ELISA S/P = enzyme-linked 
immunosorbent assay serum-to-positive; PCR = polymerase chain reaction 
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Table 5.  Summary comparing the number of pigs seroconverting to porcine reproductive 
and respiratory syndrome virus (PRRSV) or censored based on reason for removal from 
longitudinal study involving 23 barns each with 20 pigs housed together in the same pen 
from nursery through market 
Removal reason 
Total 
n (%)* 
Left censored†
n (%) 
Seroconverted‡ 
n (%) 
Right censored§
n (%) 
Death 33 (7.2) 2 (5.9) 15 (3.7) 16 (100) 
MIA 6 (1.3) 0 (0) 6 (1.5) 0 (0) 
Lost tags 29 (6.3) 0 (0) 29 (7.1) 0 (0) 
Marketed 372 (80.9) 26 (76.5) 346 (84.4) 0 (0) 
TOTALS 460 (100) 34 (7.4) 410 (89.1) 16 (3.5) 
 
*Percentages are based on the total for the column with the exception of the last row with 
totals which represents the percentage based on total number of pigs in the study (n=460). 
†Left censored was defined as seroconversion having occurred before enrollment. 
‡Seroconversion to PRRSV was defined as an increase from negative titers to a positive titer 
(S/P 0.4) that was maintained for at least 2 consecutive periods.  For pigs that did not have a 
recorded negative sample (i.e. possible maternal antibodies) seroconversion was defined as 
the first change in S/P values resulting in an upward trend that was maintained for at least 2 
consecutive periods. 
§Right censored was defined as pig did not seroconvert by the time it was removed from the 
study. 
PRRSV = porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus; MIA=missing in action (i.e. 
pigs became unaccounted for) 
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Table 7.  Parameter estimates and hazard ratios (HR) for all variables identified as 
significant by Cox proportional hazards multivariate regression analysis for time-to-
seroconversion to porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus (PRRSV) in 23 
cohorts each with 20 pigs (n=460) housed together in a pen from nursery through market 
       95% CI 
Parameter Estimate SE P  HR LCI UCI 
Pig PCR result* 3.52642 0.73442 <0.0001  34.00 8.06 143.44
Pig PCR result (time)† -1.04311 0.19265 <0.0001  0.35 0.24 0.51 
Barn PCR number‡ 0.50401 0.15258 0.001  1.66 1.23 2.23 
Barn PCR number (time) -0.13273 0.04454 0.0029  0.88 0.80 0.96 
Pig start weight category§        
 middle vs smallest 0.11169 0.03704 0.0026  1.12 1.04 1.20 
 middle vs largest 0.20790 0.07830 0.0079  1.23 1.06 1.44 
Nursery space per pig** 3.89256 1.18819 0.0011  49.04 4.78 503.41
Pig starting PRRSV 
ELISA†† 
       
 medium vs negative -0.49467 0.12741 0.0001  0.61 0.48 0.78 
 high vs negative -0.69912 0.18912 0.0002  0.50 0.34 0.72 
 high vs low -0.35690 0.11390 0.0017  0.70 0.56 0.87 
Waterer type‡‡        
 cup vs both 1.49007 0.41500 0.0003  4.44 1.97 10.01 
 nipple vs both -1.25400 0.46540 0.0071  0.29 0.11 0.71 
Farm site all-in-all-out -1.04515 0.35084 0.0029  0.35 0.18 0.70 
*Tetracore Inc., Rockville, MD, USA. 
†(time) = interaction variable with time. 
‡Number of PCR positive pigs in the cohort at enrollment. 
§Pigs were categorized within a barn (cohort) based on their initial weight as follows: 
smallest (lightest 7 pigs), middle (middle 6 pigs), and largest (heaviest 7 pigs). 
**Space calculated as m2/pig.  
††HerdCheck ® 2XR, IDEXX, Westbrook, Maine, USA) categorized based on serum-to-
positive (S/P) values. 
‡‡Waterer type as either a cup (cup, bowl, wet/dry feeder), nipple, or both (cup and nipple). 
PPRSV = porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus (PRRSV); HR = hazard ratio; 
95% CI = 95% confidence interval for hazard ratio; LCI = lower confidence interval 
estimate; UCI = upper confidence interval estimate; ELISA = enzyme-linked immunosorbent  
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Figure 1.  Median porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus (PRRSV) IDEXX 
HerdCheck ® 2XR ELISA serum-to-positive (S/P) values for positive (S/P  0.400) and 
negative (S/P < 0.400) serum samples from 460 study pigs (23 barns with 20 pigs per barn 
housed together in a single pen) sampled every 2 weeks to detect the rate of seroconversion 
from nursery through market 
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Figure 2.  Bland-Altman agreement plot between the two different serial number kits used 
in determine the porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus (PRRSV) ELISA 
S/P values for the samples described in Figure 1.  The solid red line is the calculated mean 
difference between the natural log transformation of results obtained for the same 
sample’s ELISA S/P for each serial kit.  The dotted red lines encompass the 95% CI for 
the mean difference.  Paired sample t-test did not show statistically significant difference 
between both test kits (P>0.05) 
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Figure 3.  Distribution of the grouping of the number of pigs within a cohort (n=20) 
testing positive for porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus (PRRSV) at the 
time of enrollment via polymerase chain reaction (PCR) for each of the23 study barns 
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Figure 4.  Distribution of the average number of pigs per pen for all 23 barns analyzed in 
longitudinal study to detect the rate of seroconversion to porcine reproductive and 
respiratory syndrome virus (PRRSV) 
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Figure 5.  Distribution of the range of the number of 2-week periods needed for all pigs in 
a cohort to complete seroconversion to porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome 
virus (PRRSV) for all 23 barns studied.  See Table 5 for a description of study and 
definitions used to determine seroconversion.  For this graph, period 1 was defined as the 
first time period when the first pig in the cohort was determined to have seroconverted to 
PRRSV 
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Figure 6.  Kaplan-Meier survival curve comparing for the number of days until 
seroconversion to porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus (PRRSV) was 
detected between pigs that were polymerase chain reaction (PCR) positive for PRRSV and 
those testing negative at enrollment.  The study involved 460 pigs in cohorts of 20 pigs 
housed together in the same pen in 23 barns from enrollment until marketed.  See Table 5 
for definitions on seroconversion.  The log-rank test identified these two groups as having 
statistically different survival curves (P<0.001) 
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Figure 7.  Kaplan-Meier survival curve comparing for the number of days-to-
seroconversion to porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus (PRRSV) was 
detected between pigs of different starting weights within a cohort.  Pigs were categorized 
within a barn (cohort) based on their initial weight as follows: SMALLEST (lightest 7 
pigs), MIDDLE (middle 6 pigs), and LARGEST (heaviest 7 pigs).  See Figure 5 and Table 
5 for study information and definitions on seroconversion.  The log-rank test did not 
identify any statistical differences in the survival curves between all three weight groups 
(P>0.05) 
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Figure 8.  Kaplan-Meier survival curve comparing the number of days-to-seroconversion 
to porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus (PRRSV) detected between pigs 
with different levels of PRRSV ELISA serum-to-positive (S/P) values at enrollment. Pigs 
were categorized based on S/P value into: NEGATIVE (<0.400), LOW (0.400 to 0.999), 
MEDIUM (1.000 to 1.999), and HIGH (2.000).  See Figure 5 and Table 5 for study 
information and definitions on seroconversion.  The log-rank test did not identify any 
statistical differences in the survival curves between all four categorical grouping of 
PRRSV ELISA S/P values (P>0.05) 
 
56 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4. SURVEILLANCE OF PIG POPULATIONS USING ORAL 
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Abstract 
Currently there is a lack of a cost effective method to efficiently and routinely collect 
informative diagnostic specimens on multiple agents over multiple time periods from pig 
populations.  The objective of this study was to evaluate if oral fluids collected by barn 
personnel could be used as a method of surveillance based on PCR testing.  Approximately 
12,150 pigs in 10 wean-to-finish barns on 10 different farms were monitored for the 
circulation of porcine circovirus type 2 (PCV2), porcine reproductive and respiratory 
syndrome virus (PRRSV), influenza A virus (IAV), and Torque teno virus genogroups 1 
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(TTV1) and 2 (TTV2) using oral fluid specimens.  Oral fluid samples were collected from 6 
pens at each site starting at the time of pig placement (~3 weeks of age) and continuing 
thereafter at 2-week intervals for a period of 18 weeks.  Data were analyzed both on a pen 
basis as well as a barn basis.  Overall, 508 (85%) samples were PCR positive for PCV2, 73 
(12%) for PRRSV, 46 (8%) for IAV, 483 (81%) for TTV2, and 155 (26%) TTV1 during the 
study period. The estimated arithmetic means of the quantitative PCR-positive oral fluids for 
PCV2, PRRSV, and IAV were 1 x 104.62, 1 x 104.97, and 1 x 105.49 per ml.  With a single 
exception, all barns were positive for PCV2 and TTV2 at every sampling point in the study.  
Pathogen circulation varied among barns, particularly for IAV and PRRSV. Chi squared 
analysis of the cumulative distribution of pen level agent combinations between all 10 barns 
indicated they were statistically different from each other.  The most commonly observed 
patterns were PCV2+TTV2 (239, 40%), PCV2+TTV1+TTV2 (88, 15%), and PCV2 alone 
(66, 11%).  Although weekly mortality was the only herd health parameter available for 
evaluation, the Cox proportional hazard survival analyses showed that the issue of herd 
health is complex and will require thoughtful experimental design and analysis.  This “proof-
of-concept” project showed that a variety of pathogens circulate both intermittently and 
continuously in pig populations and demonstrated that barn health is highly variable, even 
among barns in the same production system. Oral fluid sampling and testing may ultimately 
meet the objective of being a more convenient and cost effective means for pig barn 
surveillance.  
 
58 
 
 
 
1.0 Introduction 
Over the latter half of the 20th century, commercial pig production in most parts of 
the world changed from small, extensive (outdoor), laborǦdependent, enterprises to large, 
intensive (confined), production systems.  Technification of pig production achieved higher 
production efficiencies (Hayenga, 2000), but also introduced a "new class of diseases" 
characterized by complex, multi-factorial etiologies (Bäckström and Curtis, 1981; Stärk, 
2000).  At about the time this change began to occur, Dr. Calvin Schwabe (1982) wrote an 
editorial in which he labeled the lack of "economically and scientifically viable approaches to 
the new practice of intensive livestock production" a "crisis" for preventive veterinary 
medicine.  Perhaps recognizing the complexity of the health dynamic involved, he envisioned 
a future in which veterinary practice would be "a form of on-going on-farm research based 
upon surveillance ...." Thirty years after Schwabe's editorial, this vision remains largely 
unfulfilled, primarily for lack of a method to efficiently and routinely collect informative 
diagnostic specimens from pig populations.  Infectious diseases monitoring and surveillance 
remain limited to narrowly focused research or government-funded programs and more cost 
effective approaches are always sought.  Thus, heirloom methods of diagnostic sampling 
impede the full application of analytical methods (epidemiology, disease ecology, and 
economics) to the solution of infectious disease issues in contemporary pig populations 
(Dohoo, 1993; James, 2005). 
In human diagnostic medicine, oral fluid specimens collected using simple, non-
invasive procedures are used for the detection of a wide variety of infectious agents, 
hormones, toxins, and drugs (Streckfus and Bigler, 2002; Tabak, 2001, 2007; Prickett and 
59 
 
 
 
Zimmerman, 2010).  When used in infectious disease surveillance, e.g., HIV (Connolly et al., 
2004) and measles virus (Carr et al., 2009), oral fluid testing has facilitated the safe, efficient, 
and low-cost of high volume diagnostic sample collection.  For example, in the United 
Kingdom, oral fluid specimens were collected from 11,698 children at home by their parents 
and mailed to the laboratory for antibody testing (Bartington et al., 2009).  Not so unlike 
humans, oral fluid samples are easily collected from individual pigs or pigs grouped in pens 
by allowing them to chew on cotton rope suspended in the pen for 20 to 30 minutes, 
manually extracting the fluid from the rope, and decanting the sample into a tube for 
submission to the laboratory (Pricket et al., 2008a; Kittawornrat et al., 2010).  Research has 
shown that oral fluid specimens can be used to monitor of porcine reproductive and 
respiratory syndrome virus (PRRSV) (Prickett et al., 2008a,b; Kittawornrat et al., 2010), 
porcine circovirus type 2 (PCV2) (Prickett et al., 2011), and influenza A virus (Irwin et al., 
2010) circulation in swine populations using polymerase chain reaction (PCR) assays.  The 
objective of the study described herein was to determine if Dr. Schwabe's vision of "on-going 
on-farm research based upon surveillance" could be achieved through the routine collection 
and testing of oral fluid samples from contemporary swine farms.   
2.0 Materials and Methods 
2.1 Experimental design 
Approximately 12,150 pigs housed in 10 wean-to-finish barns on 10 different farms, 
but under a unified management system, were monitored for PCV2, PRRSV, influenza A 
virus (IAV), and Torque teno virus genogroups 1 (TTV1) and 2 (TTV2) circulation using 
oral fluid specimens.  Oral fluid samples were collected from 6 pens at each site starting at 
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the time of pig placement (~3 weeks of age) and continuing thereafter at 2-week intervals for 
a period of 18 weeks.  Oral fluid specimens were primarily collected by persons working on-
site and were then mailed to Iowa State University Diagnostic Laboratory to be tested for the 
pathogens of interest by PCR-based assays.  Serum samples were collected from 5 pigs in 
each of the 6 pens during the first week of placement and in the week following the last oral 
fluid collection.  Serum samples were tested for antibodies against PCV2, PRRSV, and IAV.  
Daily mortalities were recorded by barn workers on a barn sheet and summarized for each 
week.  At the study termination, diagnostic data for PCV2, PRRSV, IAV, TTV1, and TTV2 
infections were analyzed in relation to mortality over time.    
2.2 Barns and pigs   
Animal housing, feeding, handling, and veterinary care were under the supervision of 
Murphy-Brown L.L.C. Health Assurance and Welfare personnel.  Pigs monitored in the 
study were farrowed in breeding herds located in Colorado, Illinois, Oklahoma, and Utah 
USA, weaned at approximately 21 days of age, and transported to one of 10 barns in the 
upper Midwest USA.  Pigs were vaccinated against PCV2 with a killed commercially 
available vaccine at 18 to 25 days of age, but were not vaccinated against IAV, PRRSV, or 
TTV 1 or 2.  There were no special animal treatments needed for this study.  Any and all 
treatments or interventions performed were part of the routine care administered to animals 
by their caretakers.   
The 10 barns in the project were on 10 different farms.  Each wean-to-finish barn was 
one of three barns on the farm site, with individual sites spread over approximately 645 
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kilometers.  The barns housed approximately 12,150 barrows and gilts, with 9 barns of 
~1,100 animals and one barn of 2,250 animals.  Barns were divided into 18 (n = 1), 20 (n = 
1), 36 (n = 1), 40 (n = 2), 50 (n = 4), or 60 (n = 1) pens.  All barns had fully slatted floors, 
deep-pitted manure handling systems, automated feeding systems, and nipple drinkers.  Nine 
of the barns were curtain-sided and one was tunnel ventilated.   
2.3 Biological samples   
2.3.1 Oral fluid samples 
An oral fluid sample was collected from each of the same 6 pens in each barn at 2-
week intervals.  Within each barn, the 6 selected pens were spaced approximately equidistant 
to each other over the length of the barn, with three pens distributed on each side of the 
center walkway.  Oral fluid sampling was conducted on Mondays starting the week the pigs 
were placed in the barns and continued each 2 weeks for 18 weeks thereafter (6 pens × 10 
barns × 10 samplings = 600 oral fluid samples).  To standardize and simplify oral fluid 
collection on the farm, a metal bracket with a 2.5 cm hole in the center of the horizontal 
surface was fixed in each pen.  Bracket structure and placement depended on building 
structure.  Brackets in the tunnel-ventilated building in the study were bolted to a gate in each 
pen.  Brackets in the naturally ventilated buildings (n = 9) were hung from a rafter above 
each pen.  To collect the oral fluid sample, one end of the cotton rope (1.6 cm diameter) was 
knotted and the opposite (unknotted) end threaded through the hole in the horizontal surface 
of the bracket.  The rope was then cut to length so that the loose end hung shoulder-high to 
the animals.  Each collection period lasted 30 minutes, after which the lower, wet portion 
(portion with oral fluids) of the rope was inserted into a single-use, disposable plastic bag and 
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cut from the remainder of the rope.  The rope was manually squeezed while inside the plastic 
bag to release the oral fluid, then the corner of the bag was cut and the sample decanted into a 
50 ml centrifuge tube.  Samples were chilled and shipped immediately following collection.  
For shipment, samples were placed in an insulated shipment container with frozen ice packs 
to the diagnostic laboratory.  Upon arrival at the laboratory, samples were centrifuged at 
9000 x g for 10 min, decanted into 5 ml tubes and frozen at -20°C until assayed.   
To facilitate uniform sampling, 10 "collection kits" were assembled and stocked at 
each of the 10 barns.  Each collection kit contained all of the materials necessary for one 
collection: pre-cut lengths of three-strand cotton rope 1.6 cm in width (n = 6), single-use 
disposable plastic bags (n = 6), 50 ml centrifuge tubes (n = 6), disposable scissors, a 
permanent marker for labeling tubes and bags, and a pre-paid, pre-addressed, insulated 
shipping container and ice packs for shipping samples to the laboratory following collection.  
In addition, a pictorial step-by-step guide to the process (oral fluid collection, processing, 
packaging, and shipping) was detailed on a laminated poster (0.9 m x 1.2 m) displayed in 
each barn.  Investigators demonstrated the process to caretakers, after which barn personnel 
assumed responsibility for collection.  Effort was devoted to this phase of the project to 
ensure sample quality and timely collection.   
2.3.2 Serum samples   
Blood samples were collected from 5 different pigs conveniently selected pigs in each 
of the 60 monitored pens at the time of pig placement and during the week of the final oral 
fluid collection for a total of 600 serum samples.  Samples were collected using a single-use 
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blood collection system (Becton Dickinson, Franklin Lakes, New Jersey, USA).  Blood 
samples were centrifuged at 1000 x g for 10 min, after which the serum was harvested and 
stored at –20°C. 
2.4 Laboratory assays 
Biological samples were appropriately processed by laboratory personnel and stored 
frozen in the laboratory until the study was completed.  Laboratory testing was performed 
after all samples were collected.  To avoid test bias, tubes were randomized 
(www.radom.org), renumbered, and submitted as a single set of samples.   
2.4.1 Polymerase chain reaction assays 
The presence of PCV2, PRRSV, IAV, TTV1, and TTV2 in oral fluid samples was 
determined using PCR assays.  Viral nucleic acids were extracted using commercial kits and 
the KingFisher® 96 magnetic particle processor (Thermo Scientific, Waltham, MA, USA).  
TTV nucleic acid was extracted using the MagAttract® Virus Mini M48 kit (Qiagen®, 
Valencia, CA USA), as directed by the manufacturer.  Porcine circovirus type 2, PRRSV, 
and IAV nucleic acid extraction was performed using the MagMAX™ viral RNA isolation 
kit (Applied Biosystems, Foster City, CA USA) with modifications to the manufacturer’s 
protocol described by Chittick et al. (2011). 
A quantitative real-time reverse transcription (RT)-PCR assay was used to detect 
PRRSV or IAV RNA.  The PRRSV PCR was performed using Ambion® AgPath-ID™ 
PRRSV One-Step RT-PCR kit (Applied Biosystems) on the ABI 7500 instrument (Applied 
Biosystems) and analyzed according to manufacturer’s recommendations.  A standard curve 
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was generated using the genomic copy standards provided in the kit (1 x 105 to 1 x 1010 
genomic copies per ml) and the results were expressed as PRRSV genomic equivalents per 
ml (log10).  Polymerase chain reaction for IAV was performed using the QuantiTect® Probe 
RT-PCR Kit (Qiagen) in a 20 ȝl reaction volume using 4ȝl of extract on the ABI 7900HT 
Sequence Detection System (Applied Biosystems), as previously described (Sim et al., 
2009).  A set of IAV preparations, each with a known virus titer was used to generate a 
standard curve.   
For the detection of PCV2 DNA, a quantitative PCR was performed as previously 
described (Opriessnig et al., 2003).  In brief, the PCR reaction consisted of 50 ȝl of a mixture 
that contained 25 ȝl of TaqMan® Universal PCR Master Mix (Applied Biosystems), 5 ȝl of 
extract from each sample, and primers and a probe at a final concentration of 0.4μM each 
and 0.2μM respectively.  Each plate was run in GeneAmp® 5700 Sequence Detection System 
(Applied Biosystems) under conditions specified by the manufacturer for the master mix 
used.   
To detect TTV1 and TTV2 DNA in a differential manner, a gel-based nested PCR 
was performed following the procedures, conditions, and settings described by Martinez et 
al. (2006).  The Taq PCR Core Kit #201225 (Qiagen®) was used for the initial PCR setup.  A 
primary and nested round of PCR was run to amplify TTV genetic material in the samples 
(Applied Biosystems).  The presence of TTV1, TTV2 or both in samples was visualized 
using agarose gel electrophoresis and compared to molecular weight standards 260 bp and 
230 bp respectively. 
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2.4.2 Serum antibody assays 
Serum samples were assayed for the presence of anti-PRRSV antibody using a 
commercial ELISA (HerdChek® PRRS Antibody 2XR Test Kit, IDEXX Laboratories, Inc., 
Westbrook ME USA) following the instructions provided by the manufacturer.  Data 
management and calculations were performed using software provided by the manufacturer 
with S/P values 0.40 considered positive.   
Serum samples were tested for the presence of anti-IAV antibody using a commercial 
ELISA (FlockChek® Avian Influenza MultiS-Screen Antibody Test Kit, IDEXX 
Laboratories, Inc.).  This ELISA is an epitope-blocking assay in which labeled monoclonal 
antibody against influenza A nucleoprotein (NP) is blocked from binding to the NP-coated 
microtiter plate if the serum sample contains antibody against NP.  Ciacci-Zanella et al. 
(2010) evaluated the AI-MS ELISA using serum samples from 304 negative control pigs and 
149 serum samples from 84 animals pigs experimentally inoculated with a variety of IAV 
isolates (H1N1, H1N2, H2N3, H3N2) and reported the diagnostic sensitivity and specificity 
of the assay at 94.6% and 99.3%, respectively, at a sample-to-negative (S/N) cutoff of 0.60.  
In this study, pig serum samples were tested for anti-influenza antibody according to the 
instructions provided by the manufacturer.  Data management and calculations were 
performed using software provided by the manufacturer, with S/N values 0.60 considered 
positive.   
Serum samples were tested for anti-PCV2 antibody using an ELISA described by 
Nawagitgul et al. (2002).  In brief, serum samples were diluted 1:100 in 5% non-fat dry milk 
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(NFDM) in phosphate buffered saline (PBS) and assayed in two wells coated with partially-
purified recombinant open reading frame two (ORF2) protein that had been produced in 
baculovirus-infected cells.  To measure background reactivity, serum samples were 
concurrently assayed in two wells coated with baculovirus-infected insect cells (SF-9 cells, 
Invitrogen 11496-015, Carlsbad, CA USA).  Controls consisted of PCV2 antibody-positive 
serum diluted in PBS to the appropriate range of reactivity and antibody-negative serum from 
a cesarean-derived, colostrum-deprived pig determined to be free of PCV2.  Antibody-
antigen reactions were detected using horseradish peroxidase-labeled anti-swine IgG 
antibody (KPL, Gaithersburg, MD USA) diluted 1:2000 in PBS followed by the addition of 
tetramethylbenzidine (TMB, KPL 52-00-03).  The reaction was read at 405 nm and measured 
as optical density (OD).  The results were corrected for non-specific reactivity and reported 
as sample-to-positive (S/P) values.  Serum S/P results 0.30 were considered positive for 
anti-PCV2 antibody.   
3.0 Data Analysis 
Statistical analyses were performed using SAS® Version 9.2 (SAS® Institute Inc., 
Cary, NC, USA).  Data was analyzed both on a pen basis as well as a barn basis.  A barn was 
considered positive for an agent when any pen out of six was positive.  Differences in the 
distribution of virus combination patterns among barns were tested using Chi-square tests.  
The association for the presence or absence between the five different viruses (PCV2, 
PRRSV, IAV, TTV1, TTV2), was assessed though pairwise comparisons using the Cochran–
Mantel–Haenszel test stratified by barn and pen.  If a significant association was identified, 
differences in odds ratios between barns and pens were evaluated using the Breslow-Day 
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Test for homogeneity.  Data were subjected to survival analysis using the PHREG procedure 
in SAS used at a barn level to evaluate the association between the number of positive pens 
samples and the mortality for each agent.  Mortality information was captured on a weekly 
basis. Oral fluid samples were collected every two weeks.  To better associate the weekly 
mortality with an oral fluid sampling, for the weekly periods when samples were not taken, 
the results from the pervious and the next sampling period were averaged.  Both univariate 
and multivariate estimates for hazard ratio were calculated associating weekly oral fluid 
results (number of pens positive for each of the five viral agents) and the mortality for the 
following week.  Barn was used as a fixed effect in the model. 
4.0 Results 
Samples were collected between June and November of 2007.  Field personnel did 
not report any difficulty in collecting, processing, packaging, and submitting samples to the 
diagnostic laboratory.  No samples or sampling periods were missed and samples arrived at 
the laboratory in good condition.   
4.1 Serum antibody results vs. oral fluid PCR results   
Analysis of the PCR data in the context of serum antibody results (Table 1) showed 
general agreement in herd infection status between the two assays with three inconsistencies:   
1. Cumulatively, 127 (71%) of the 180 oral fluid samples collected from barns 1, 
8, and 9 were PCR positive for PCV2, including 16 (89%) of the 18 samples collected at 
week 18.  However, only 30% (barn 1), 37% (barn 8), and 13% (barn 9) of the animals tested 
serologically positive at week 18 (Table 1).   On a barn level basis, conclusions on the PCV2 
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status of the barn were the same for oral fluids and serum testing.  
2. Barn 8 had one PRRSV PCR-positive and 59 (98%) PCR-negative oral fluid 
samples over the course of the observation period.  Serologically, 30 of 30 pigs in barn 8 
were negative for PRRSV serum antibodies at week 18.  On the basis of this evidence, the 
single PRRSV PCR positive oral fluid was considered a false positive and reclassified as 
negative.  On a barn level basis, conclusions on the PRRSV status of the barn would be 
different for oral fluids (barn considered positive) and serum testing (barn considered 
negative). 
3.   A comparison of serum samples collected the week of placement vs. week 18 
post-placement in barns 1, 7, and 10 showed that IAV seroprevalence had increased over the 
observation period (Table 1).  However, no IAV PCR-positive oral fluid samples were 
obtained from these herds.  These data suggest that the IAV PCR had produced an unknown 
number of false-negative oral fluid results over the course of the observation period.  On a 
barn level basis, conclusions on the IAV status of the barn would be different for oral fluids 
(barn considered negative) and serum testing (barn considered positive). 
4.2 Pen-level results 
The PCR data on the 600 oral fluid samples are summarized in Table 2 and Figure 1.  
Overall, 508 (85%) samples were positive for PCV2, 73 (12%) for PRRSV, 46 (8%) for IAV, 
483 (81%) for TTV2, and 155 (26%) TTV1.  Fifteen (3%) of the samples were negative for 
all 5 agents, 117 (20%) were positive for one agent, 289 (48%) for 2 agents, 149 (25%) for 3 
agents, 27 (5%) for 4 agents, and 3 (0.5%) for all 5.  Twenty-four of 32 possible outcomes (a 
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binary outcome for each of five different PCRs or 25) were observed, with combinations of 
agents more common early in the post-weaning period (Table 2).  The most commonly 
observed patterns were PCV2+TTV2 (n = 239, 40%), PCV2+TTV1+TTV2 (n = 88, 15%), 
and PCV2 alone (n = 66, 11%).  Cumulatively, one of these three patterns were detected in 
393 (65%) of the 600 samples. 
4.3 Barn-level results 
Barns were considered positive if one or more pen samples were PCR positive for the 
agent of interest (Figure 2).  On that basis, all barns were positive for PCV2 and TTV2 at 
every sampling point in the study except for one PCV2-negative sampling from barn 8 and 
one TTV2-negative sampling from barn 6.  All barns were positive for TTV1 at least once, 
and 9 of 10 (90%) barns were positive for PRRSV at least once during the observation 
period.  Seven of 10 (70%) barns were PCR-positive for IAV at least once, but as discussed 
in Section 4.1, IAV was determined to have circulated undetected in the remaining 3 barns 
on the basis of the serum antibody response of pigs in this barn.  For TTV1, but even more so 
for PRRSV and IAV, the pattern of circulation (onset and duration) was highly variable 
among farms. 
Overall, Chi squared testing identified there were differences in cumulative 
distribution of pen level agent combinations between all 10 barns (p < 0.001).  Pairwise 
comparisons of the presence or absence of viral agents stratified by barn and pen only 
identified statistically significant positive associations between PRRSV and TTV1 (p = 
0.018) and between PCV2 and IAV (p = 0.002).  No other associations between agents were 
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identified as statistically significant at p  0.05. 
4.4 Quantification of viral shedding 
The arithmetic means of quantitative PCR-positive oral fluid pen samples over time 
are shown in Figure 3.  The arithmetic means for PCV2, PRRSV, and IAV were 1 x 104.62 
(based on 510 PCV2-positive samples), 1 x 104.97 (based on 73 PRRSV-positive samples), 
and 1 x 105.49 (based on 46 IAV-positive samples) genomic equivalents per ml.  No IAV-
positive pens were detected in any barn at 10 and 12 weeks post-placement.  Quantification 
of TTV1 or TTV2 was not possible as only a gel-based PCR (i.e., qualitative) was available. 
4.5 Association of mortality with agent detection 
The average weekly mortality rate for all barns over the study period was 2.04 pigs 
per 1000 (Figure 1).  Univariate and multivariate survival analysis using Cox proportional 
model examined the association between PCR-positivity for infectious agents and mortality 
are summarized in Table 3.  The hazard ratio is the ratio of the instantaneous conditional risk 
for mortality given a pig has survived up to that point.  The univariate analysis identified 
statistically significant hazard ratios (HR) for TTV1 (HR = 1.089; p = 0.022) and IAV (HR = 
1.160; p < 0.001) with PRRSV (HR = 1.075; p = 0.052) being close to statistically 
significant.  The multivariate analysis did not show any statistically significant interactions 
among other pathogens.  Multivariate hazard ratios for TTV2 (HR = 0.805; p = 0.008) and 
IAV (HR = 1.203; p < 0.001) were the only two identified as statistically significant.  
5.0 Discussion 
Swine producers and veterinarians routinely make herd health decisions with little 
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baseline information.  These decisions are balanced between disease losses that occur when 
necessary treatment is withheld and costs that occur when the unneeded or mis-timed 
treatment is applied.  Swine health researchers experience similar limitations in the breadth 
and depth of data collected for clinical trials and field studies and often are unable to account 
for potentially significant interactions among pathogens.  The lack of complete and timely 
infectious disease information primarily stems from the inconvenience and cost of acquiring 
diagnostic samples, i.e., the labor and expense of routinely and periodically collecting and 
testing statistically meaningful numbers of blood, feces, or nasal swab samples from 
individual pigs.  To address this shortcoming, we evaluated a method of surveillance based 
on PCR testing of biweekly collections of pen-based oral fluid samples by farm personnel.   
Oral fluid sampling was easily implemented by producers and caretakers.  With the 
exception of one set of samples from on barn that were collected a few days late, all samples 
arrived in the laboratory via the mails as scheduled and in good condition and no sampling 
periods were missed resulting in 100% compliance.  For future animal health emergencies, it 
should be noted that oral fluid sampling by barn personnel completely eliminated the risk of 
moving pathogens between sites during the process of specimen collections.   
Diagnostic assays for oral fluids are well-established in human diagnostic medicine 
(Prickett and Zimmerman, 2010), but are still in the process of development and validation 
for swine oral fluid specimens.  In this study it was determined that the PCR assay used for 
the detection of IAV produced an unknown number of false-negative results.  This short-
coming will be rectified as diagnostic assays for oral fluid are further refined (Chittick et al., 
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2011; Detmer et al., 2011).  In addition to PCR-based assays, adaptation of antibody assays 
to porcine oral fluid specimens is an important development (Prickett et al., 2011).  
Polymerase chain reaction assays are useful for documenting circulation of a pathogen in a 
population, but isotype-specific antibody assays could inform regarding the stage of herd 
immunity.  In addition, antibody testing may allow for surveillance at a lower cost than is 
currently possible with PCR assays.  As validated PCR and antibody assays become available 
for oral fluid-based surveillance of swine populations, the repertoire of oral fluid testing will 
hopefully include pathogens of international concern, e.g., foot-and-mouth disease virus 
(Eblé et al., 2004), classical swine fever virus (Weesendorp et al., 2009), African swine fever 
virus (Greig and Plowright, 1970), and others.  This cost-effective approach could make 
disease prevention and control accessible to more parts of the world where pigs are an 
economically important food source.    
One or more pathogens were detected by PCR-based assays in 98% of the pen 
samples (585 out of 600).  In general, PCV2 and TTV2 were both found in > 70% and 
PRRSV, IAV, and TTV1 detected in < 33% of the samples at each time period.  Re-breaks 
with PRRSV and IAV in barns were observed using oral fluid samples.  It is unlikely that the 
agent-specific prevalences observed in this study are universally found across commercial 
farms in the USA.  Rather, the observed differences in infection rates among agents underline 
the fact that sample size should take into account the agent’s expected prevalence.  In this 
study we arbitrarily chose to 6 samples per barn per period.  
Given that the 10 farms were under a centralized management system, a certain 
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degree of uniformity among barns was expected in the virus circulation patterns.  
Unexpectedly, pathogen circulation varied among barns, particularly for IAV and PRRSV.  
For example, PRRSV was detected in 7 of 10 biweekly samplings from Barn 3, but only 1 of 
10 samplings in Barn 5.  In the case of Barn 5, 5 of the 6 (83%) oral fluid samples were PCR-
positive at the time of the one positive sampling and PRRSV infection was subsequently 
confirmed by serology.  Interestingly, the field data did not coincide with the development of 
herd immunity and PRRSV excretion cessation reported in the literature (Wills et al., 1997; 
Molina et al., 2008).  In the case of Barn 3, PRRSV excretion in oral fluids was much longer 
than would have been predicted from the research and in Barn 5, much shorter.  Whether 
these observations are a function of virus isolate, “population”, or some factor waiting to be 
identified remains an open question.  Finding the answer may require the re-examination of 
assumptions regarding infectious diseases in swine populations.  As noted by Diez Roux and 
Aiella (2005), “Populations are usually viewed as collections of individuals, rather than as 
meaningful entities with inherent properties….”   
Although mortality was the only herd health parameter available for evaluation, the 
analyses showed that the herd health is complex and will require thoughtful experimental 
design and analysis.  For example, univariate and multivariate analyses arrived at different 
conclusions regarding the role and statistical significance of TTV1, TTV2, and PRRSV.  It is 
interesting to postulate that the protective nature of TTV2 identified in the multivariate 
analysis could be attributed to an immune response that has been modified due to previous 
exposure to a different agent.  Although we did not identify any interactions in our model, it 
could be due to some other factor that was not evaluated in our study.  Arriving at a 
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definitive conclusion concerning which analysis was more correct was not among the 
objectives of this study.  Of relevance is the fact that field studies not accounting for 
pathogen variety and the complex circulation will almost certainly produce mistakes in 
analysis and interpretation of their experimental data.   
The addition of infectious disease data to the production data typically collected in 
contemporary swine herds will result in large, complex datasets.  Although site personnel can 
collect oral samples, animal health specialists and veterinarians will need to integrate the 
infectious disease data with production data, perform the analyses, and integrate their 
discoveries with actions and interventions to improve herd health.  While this development 
will mandate training in statistical and analytical methods, it does not eliminate the need for 
veterinarians to “walk the barns”.  Clinical skills and observational powers will continue to 
remain important tools in the armamentarium.   
6.0 Conclusion 
This study was a “proof-of-concept” project to determine whether the collection and 
PCR testing of pen-based oral fluids was practical and useful.  Repeated sampling over time 
showed that a variety of pathogens circulate both intermittently and continuously in pig 
populations and demonstrated that barn health is highly variable, even among barns in the 
same production system.  In addition, the data suggested that concepts of pathogen 
circulation and herd immunity based on small populations of pigs in research settings may 
not accurately describe the situation in the field.  Farver et al. (1985) expressed the hope that 
animal health specialists would use “disease prevalence surveys to monitor the health of the 
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food animal population in an attempt to anticipate a health problem long before it becomes a 
full-blown epidemic."  Oral fluid sampling and testing may ultimately meet this objective.   
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Table 3.  Univariate and multivariate hazard survival analyses for the association of 
number of pens testing PCR positive for each agent and barn mortality for the following 
week in a study designed to evaluate circulation of porcine reproductive and respiratory 
syndrome virus (PRRSV), porcine circovirus type 2 (PCV2) influenza A virus (IAV), and 
Torque teno virus genotypes 1 and 2 (TTV1, TTV2) 
 Univariate analysis  Multivariate analysis 
 HRa p-valueb  HR p-value
PCV2 0.934 0.2107  0.941 0.2863 
TTV2 0.941 0.3929  0.805 0.0075 
TTV1 1.089 0.0217  1.461 0.0806 
PRRSV 1.075 0.0522  0.743 0.1714 
IAV 1.160 < 0.0001  1.203 < 0.0001 
 
aHR=hazard ratio 
bChi squared 
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Figure 1.  Virus circulation and mortality rate over time in 10 wean-to-finish barns 
(12,150 animals) in a study designed to evaluate circulation of porcine reproductive and 
respiratory syndrome virus (PRRSV), porcine circovirus type 2 (PCV2) influenza A virus 
(IAV), and Torque teno virus genotypes 1 and 2 (TTV1, TTV2) 
 
Virus circulation was determined at 2-week intervals by PCR testing of pen-based oral 
fluid samples (6 pens per barn) in 10 barns for porcine circovirus type 2 (PCV2), Torque 
teno virus genogroups 1 and 2 (TTV1, TTV2), porcine reproductive and respiratory 
syndrome virus (PRRSV), and influenza A virus (IAV)starting at placement at 
approximately 3 weeks of age. 
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Figure 2.  Presence of porcine circovirus type 2 (PCV2), Torque teno virus genogroups 1 
and 2 (TTV1, TTV2), porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus (PRRSV), and 
influenza A virus (IAV) in barns over time.   
 
Barns were considered positive if one or more of the 6 pen-based oral fluid samples were 
PCR positive for the agent of interest. A colored filled dot indicates the presence of the select 
agent at the specific timeframe post placement at 3 weeks of age.
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Figure 3.  Arithmetic means of genomic equivalents per ml of oral fluid samples positive 
by quantitative PCR for porcine circovirus type 2 (PCV2), porcine reproductive and 
respiratory syndrome virus (PRRSV), and influenza A virus (IAV) 
 
Study involved testing 6 pens each in 10 different barns every 2 weeks starting with 
placement at approximately 3 weeks of age. 
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Introduction 
The United States (U.S.) swine industry has undergone dramatic changes in the last 
two decades.  Some of these changes have included a declining number of operations, 
increasing herd sizes, increasing sow productivity and farm specialization.  Regionalization 
of the industry is also occurring with a large number of sows located in the southeastern U.S. 
including Oklahoma and North Carolina, while the Midwest, especially Iowa, has become a 
central location for feeding pigs to market. 
The following graphs from United States Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) 
National Agricultural Statistic Service (NASS) data demonstrate the direction the industry 
has taken over the past several decades.  The first graph includes years 1900- 2010 (Figure 1) 
and demonstrates the changes in the December hog inventories in the U.S. which do vary 
somewhat from year to year.  The second graph includes years 1965- 2010 and highlights the 
decrease in the number of farms with hogs, followed by an increase in the number of hogs 
per farm.  These trends within the U.S. swine industry have a direct impact on and highlight 
the importance of mitigating disease spread on a farm, as well as between farms, as failures 
to control disease spread could have more costly consequences. 
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Figure 1. United States Department of Agriculture December hog inventories for all pigs 
by year from 1900 to 2010. 
 
 
Since 1900, the total number of all hogs (breeding and market) in the U.S. based on 
December 1 inventory has generally fluctuated between 50 and 70 million with 2010 
inventories being at just over 64.3 million.  The lowest inventories occurred in 1934 with just 
over 39 million hogs and the highest occurred nine years later in 1943 with 83.7 million. 
The total number of farms with hogs in the U.S. has been steadily decreasing.  The 
number of farms dropped from 1.06 million farms in 1965 to 60,460 by 2010 (Figure 2).  
That is just over a 94% decrease in farm numbers in 45 years.  During this same time frame, 
the average number of hogs per farm has increased from 48 to 1,064 head. 
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Figure 2.  Number of farms with hogs and average number of hogs per farm from 1965 to 
2010 as reported by the United States Department of Agriculture. 
 
 
The swine industry is recognized as being proactive and innovative in regards to 
biosecurity measures.  A 2008 study by Moore et al1 identified the poultry industry as having 
the most extensive and consistent set of biosecurity recommendations available online 
followed by swine.  The awareness of disease transmission is recognized by the industry, but 
unfortunately these practices are not always effectively implemented.  With that in mind, it is 
best to address disease transmission from the perspective of biological risk management 
(BRM). 
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Importance of Swine Biological Risk Management 
The objective of the swine industry is to profitably produce a consistent, high quality, 
wholesome, and safe product for consumers around the world.  The U.S. is the second largest 
pork producing country in the world, after China.  In 2009, approximately 10,446,000 metric 
tons of pork, 10% of the world’s production, was produced in the U.S.  According to data 
from the USDA Foreign Agricultural Service in 2008, pork is the world’s most widely eaten 
meat compromising 40% of the meat consumed worldwide.   
Export markets have contributed to the profitability of the U.S. pork producer for 
several years.  According to the annual study conducted by University of Missouri 
economists Ron Plain and Glenn Grimes, exports contributed $40.56 for every pig sold in the 
U.S. during 2008.  One only has to look at the following table containing data from the U.S. 
Meat Export Federation to see how exports have increased over the past ten years.   
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Table 1.  Total U.S. Pork Exports from 1999 to 2009, including variety meat, according to 
the U.S. Meat Export Federation. 
Total U.S. Pork Exports 
1999-2009 
 Volume Value 
Year (Metric tons) ($Billions) 
2009 1,865,745 4.329 
2008 2,052,447 4.884 
2007 1,305,622 3.154 
2006 1,262,499 2.864 
2005 1,157,689 2.634 
2004 1,023,413 2.227 
2003 757,406 1.582 
2002 726,357 1.504 
2001 702,377 1.556 
2000 581,497 1.347 
1999 564,046 1.233 
 
The emergence of the H1N1 influenza strain caused exports in 2009 to fall below the 
record levels of 2008.  However, 2009 exports were still above 2007 levels and continued to 
make a positive contribution to hog prices. 
Zoonotic diseases are not the only diseases which can have a huge impact on the 
swine industry.  In 1991, postweaning multisystemic wasting syndrome (PMWS) was first 
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identified in Canada.  The disease was characterized by wasting pigs, anemia, fever, enlarged 
lymph nodes, high morbidity (4 – 60%), and variable mortality (4-20%).2   By 1997, PMWS 
was being reported as a sporadic condition in several locations throughout Canada and the 
U.S.  At the same time, France and Spain were observing a similar syndrome which spread to 
other European countries.  Soon it was reported that a different porcine circovirus strain (now 
called porcine circovirus type II or PCV2) was associated with this new disease.  This new 
syndrome appeared to be sporadic in North America, yet common in Europe.  Clinical signs 
in Europe were observed in the nursery phase of production, while in the U.S. clinical signs 
associated with PMWS were more frequently documented in the early to mid-finishing phase 
of production.  In the U.S., the swine industry initially ignored the problem, determining it 
was a “European” issue.  Most hogs tested positive for PCV2 during the initial testing in the 
U.S., yet no clinical signs were being noted.  Therefore, the conclusion was that PMWS was 
not important.  Some clinicians even started calling it the “circus virus.”  While the European 
swine industry organized a significant research effort, the U.S. practically ignored the issue.  
The attitude by many practitioners was that the problem was not related to “our” industry.  
PCV2 submissions to the Iowa State Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory increased from the 
late 1990 and peaked in 2002.  This led many to believe the problem was over; especially 
considering it was never identified as a “major” issue of concern.  Then in early 2005, 
Canada started to have a severe PMWS outbreak with high mortality.  Initially, many in the 
U.S. were thinking this outbreak was just a late peak in cases for the Canadians; just like 
cases had peaked in the U.S. in 2002.  By mid-summer, as health conditions in Canada 
deteriorated and large numbers of Canadian hogs continued entering the U.S. to be fed-out to 
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market, the U.S. swine industry was in high alert.  This disease which had a significant 
impact elsewhere finally seemed like it was making its way to the U.S.  Now, it was not a 
matter of “if” it will arrive in the U.S., but rather “when.”  In November of 2005, many large 
operations in the U.S. noted a dramatic increase in early finishing mortality, starting in North 
Carolina where mortality was reaching 50 - 60% in some units.  Within a few weeks, the 
PMWS epidemic was upon the U.S. industry.  Many operations began averaging over a five-
fold increase in their average mortality early in the finishing phase.  At that time, no vaccines 
or treatment protocols could stop or mitigate the consequences of the syndrome renamed 
porcine circovirus associated disease (PCVAD).  Although PCVAD is a multifactorial 
disease, it is believed that a small mutation in the PCV2 virus had a dramatic impact in the 
virulence of the pathogen.  Why did we ignore this virus for so long?  How did this virus 
spread so quickly across the U.S.?  Many experts believe that biosecurity lapses in a highly 
interconnected industry are to blame. 
Risk Perception 
The category of risk perception examines what those involved with the industry think 
about the real and potential risks of infectious and zoonotic diseases.  These perceptions may 
be influenced by on farm experiences, or by what owners, managers, and employees have 
read in magazines, on the internet, or in the paper.  This is where one may encounter many of 
the obstacles and challenges to educating about risk management.  Many individuals have 
negative perceptions associated with risk management, most of which are based around ideas 
of disbelief or economic concerns.  Common negative beliefs include the following: 
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x I already know this information. 
x We have always done it this way. 
x I’ve already had most every disease on this farm. 
x I don’t have enough time to mess with this. 
x It’s too complicated. 
x It won’t make a difference. 
x It’s too expensive. 
x I don’t have the space. 
x Our animals were tested once and we found nothing.  It was just a waste of 
money. 
x Our farm is pretty safe. 
Risk of disease transmission cannot be totally eliminated, but attention paid to 
biological risk management can reduce risks and their consequences.  While it is difficult to 
prove and measure the benefit of things that don’t happen, counter-arguments tend to fall into 
three categories: there is a risk, it is economically worthwhile to prepare, and the overall 
impact must be considered. 
x Infectious/zoonotic disease outbreaks can and do happen. 
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x Prevention is always less costly than treatment. 
x Protecting your financial investment and your future assets from liability is 
worthwhile insurance. 
x Protecting employees saves time and money. 
x A biological risk management plan established and followed can reduce the 
risk of disease transmission to an acceptable level for minimal to no disruptions in 
continuity of operation during a foreign animal disease event. 
x A focus on preventative medicine helps to maximize public and 
environmental health of your community. 
x Prevention of disease through awareness and management of infectious 
disease risk is an important part of improving animal welfare. 
Risk Assessment 
To increase its effectiveness and completeness, a comprehensive risk assessment 
should be performed from a variety of perspectives.  First and foremost, the general herd 
characteristics and farm policies should be examined through pre-assessment questions in 
order to gather enough information to better understand the specific characteristics of that 
particular farm. 
In reviewing this material, it is imperative to understand that attention is focused on 
routes of transmission, not specific disease entities.  Assessing risk based on routes of 
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transmission provides a more complete and holistic approach while avoiding emphasizing 
specific diseases.  Any references made to specific diseases, syndromes or infectious agents 
in this material is for illustrative purposes only, and no specific recommendations are 
suggested as to vaccination, treatment or testing procedures.  This focus will make the 
information applicable to a variety of audiences and remain relevant even as scientific 
advances improve our understanding of diseases. 
Risk Management 
This document illustrates the best available “standard operating procedures” for a 
wide range of management practices.  Each veterinarian should perform a thorough 
assessment of each operation to identify opportunities for improvement.  Management 
recommendations should focus on which ones are most practical, applicable, and 
economically feasible.  Most recommendations can be implemented independent of others.  
This will result in tailoring the BRM program for each producer based upon his/her 
preferences, resources, risk perception and risk tolerance.  Some suggestions may not be 
feasible for a given facility; but recognizing what is optimum helps establish long term goals. 
General Practices 
Internal vs.  External 
Traditionally BRM is divided into external and internal risks.  The objectives are 
different.  When looking to mitigate external risks, the objective is to prevent the introduction 
of a new disease or strain into an operation.  On the other hand, internal BRM is designed to 
minimize the spread of diseases which are already present within an operation.  For the 
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purpose of this paper, we will not make the distinction between internal and external BRM.  
Instead, our focus is the route of transmission.  Veterinarians and producers can refer to 
internal vs.  external risks when prioritizing the management recommendations identified 
pertinent to a particular operation based on their specific needs and goals. 
Location 
The farm/unit location is likely the single most important risk factor for new disease 
introduction.  Although there is evidence that some bacteria and viruses may move by 
airborne routes, the actual range of spread by infectious particles or perhaps aerial vectors is 
unknown.  The range of transmission is likely highly variable and dependent upon 
meteorological phenomena as well as local topography and will be discussed further under 
the aerosol section.  We do know that in high pig density areas, disease agents often find 
their way to near-by locations even when stringent safety measures are in place (area spread).  
Epidemiological field studies often fail to confirm the source of new disease agents.  We also 
know that indirect contact between the pigs and the outside world is greatly increased in 
these high density areas.  In a recently published study, the number of direct livestock 
contacts (number of times animals were moved from one farm to another) per month for 
some pig farms in California was an average of 0.2/month, but the indirect contact rate 
(number of times people or vehicles that had visited more than one facility and therefore 
could act as fomites) was 807/ month.3 In areas of high pig density many, if not most, of the 
indirect livestock contact rate would be associated with pigs from other farms.  Although in 
an ideal world one would select a location as far away from other pigs as possible (especially 
for higher health segments of the industry – see next section on health pyramids), many times 
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this is not practical, feasible, or even an option.  High traffic areas (especially those used by 
others to transport pigs) can be a risk for aerosol transmission of different diseases.  With the 
concept of BRM, one must realize the current limitations of all operations and concentrate on 
other ways one can try and mitigate disease transmission.   
Iowa has been the number one state in pig numbers for many years.  Because of this, 
most genetic companies have elected to locate their genetic nucleus herds outside this state.  
Locating these high health herds as far away from other pigs as possible minimizes the 
opportunity for exposure to swine pathogens though the air or area spread.   
Health Pyramid 
The swine industry has been proactive in establishing production pyramids to be able 
to produce high quality, high health status breeding stock.  These pyramids are referred to as 
genetic or health pyramids.  Technically, genetic pyramids focus only on the structure of 
genetic breeding (parents, grandparents, F1s, etc.), while health pyramids focus primarily on 
the health status of different operations.  In essence, the concept is the same, and therefore 
we will address them simply as health pyramids.  The number of operations in each category 
of a pyramid increases as you move down the pyramid.  For example, one genetic nucleus 
can supply nine nurseries which may feed into 18 different finishers, etc.  (1Æ9Æ18Æetc.).  
The exact numbers are not important, but rather the concept that more operations are being 
impacted as you move farther down the base of the pyramid.  The following diagram helps 
visualize a typical health pyramid. 
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Genetic Nucleus (Boars and Sows)  – Top of the health pyramid    
Genetic Nucleus (Nurseries)     
Genetic Nucleus (Finishers)     
Gilt Developer Units (GDU) 
Commercial Sow Farms 
Commercial Nurseries 
Commercial Finishers 
Abattoir     – Bottom of the health pyramid 
 
The goal of a pyramid is to designate specific farms for specific production needs.  
Not only does this allow maximizing genetic pools, but also an opportunity to focus on health 
issues at these sites.  As operations look at maximizing their investment returns, health 
pyramids help prioritize resources.  The hierarchal nature of the pyramid highlights a key 
biological risk management factor.  The basis for the continued success of a “disease free” 
herd relies primarily on its ability to continue to have a “disease free” source of replacement 
animals.  The advent of a better understanding of the porcine reproductive and respiratory 
syndrome (PRRS) disease emphasized the importance of this key point.  Because of this, all 
of the major genetic suppliers in the U.S. recognize that they needed to provide PRRSV 
naïve animals.  There is a distinction between a naïve animal and a negative animal.  The 
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definition of a naïve animal is an animal that has never been exposed to a particular disease 
agent.  A negative animal just implies that the animal tests serologically negative.  However, 
this particular animal could have, at one time, been exposed to a particular agent and has 
become serologically negative over time.  We have also realized within the past 15 years that 
not all positive animals are equal.  This is especially true when looking at diseases such as 
PRRS in which there are multiple strains circulating.  Just because an animal has been 
exposed to a particular strain does not imply in any way that it would be resistant or less 
susceptible to a different strain.  Herds that are negative do not provide the same sense of 
safety as a naïve herd.  With non-naïve herds, there is always the question of whether they 
are truly negative or just have a low incidence of disease which is not being detected through 
routine monitoring programs.  Because of this, heavy emphasis is placed on obtaining naïve 
replacement animals.   
Through the development of health pyramids, the industry has created a method to 
become more efficient at producing healthy replacement animals, but has also opened 
themselves up to a risk of disseminating new diseases to a larger number of operations.  The 
use of a centralized location for producing replacement animals requires the dissemination of 
these animals to several other respective farms.  So, in other words, a single genetic nucleus 
farm can provide replacement animals to several dozen commercial sow farms.  A leak of an 
undetected infectious agent from the genetic nucleus to several dozen different sow farms 
can then spread the disease to many more nurseries, which can then spread the disease to a 
larger number of finishers.  To minimize this cascading effect, operations must implement 
monitoring programs in order to quickly detect the emergence or re-emergence of any 
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disease of concern.  The earlier a disease is detected, the quicker a new plan can be 
implemented to redirect pig flow, so as to minimize the consequences of a disease break 
downstream. 
This health pyramid concept is also applicable for all swine operations when 
establishing work orders.  Although small operations might not be relying on a different 
location for providing their replacement animals, they can utilize the same concepts in 
establishing animal and people movement within their operation.  Chore order could be 
related to the health status of a particular stage of production within a farm.  At the top of this 
“health pyramid”, we would have the breeding herd.  Within the breeding herd, we prioritize 
the healthiest animals as those in the farrowing house, followed by the gestation animals, 
nursery animals, and finally the finishing animals.  Within each of these groups of animals, 
we prioritize health from youngest to oldest.  The older animals are the more likely to have 
been exposed to more disease agents; and therefore, we would consider them to be a lower 
health risk.  The concept again is the same.  We are trying to minimize the downstream 
effects of disease by controlling disease toward the top of the pyramid.  So, our chore order 
in this case would be as follows: 
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        Work order 
Breeding Stock     First – Highest Health Concern 
 Farrowing (Youngest Æ Oldest) 
 Gestation 
Nursery 
Finisher      Last – Lowest Health Concern 
 
This chore order would change if the health status of any one of the groups changes 
so as to visit any potentially infected animals last, thereby minimizing the opportunity for 
spreading disease to other groups. 
Routes of Transmission 
Pathogenic agents can be spread from animal to animal, animal to human, or human 
to animal through a variety of transmission routes.  Animals or humans can acquire disease 
causing agents through aerosol, oral, direct contact, fomites, or vectors.  Pathogen exposure 
to swine can occur in any of the aforementioned methods, and many times it occurs in more 
than one way.  Many disease agents can survive for extended periods of time in dust or 
organic matter.  This survival time is specific for each pathogen and dependent on many 
factors including temperature, light exposure, humidity, and environmental pH.  While 
environmental contamination is not a route of transmission in itself, it must always be 
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considered when developing a BRM plan.  Each route of transmission will be discussed 
separately, and some general management/control strategies will be included. 
Aerosol 
Survival of swine pathogens in air is dependent on the pathogen load, temperature, 
and humidity.  Most swine pathogens will survive for at least a few minutes after a point 
exposure to air.  Influenza A virus (IAV) has been reported to survive for 15 hours in air.4 
The duration of air contamination is extended in buildings in which pigs are continuously 
shedding organisms.  Foot-and-mouth disease virus was detected in air for 5 days,5 and 
porcine respiratory coronavirus was detected in air for 6 days in rooms housing infected 
pigs.6  The distance that pathogens can be transmitted by aerosol is widely based on 
anecdotal evidence and computer modeling.7 
Airborne transmission of pathogens is facilitated by prevailing wind velocity and 
direction, cloud cover, and humidity.8  Increasing the distance between infected and 
susceptible animals will decrease the chances that transmission will occur because pathogen 
concentration in air decreases exponentially with increasing distance.  Increasing distance 
between hogs within an operation, between other operations, wildlife, and newly introduced 
animals will help minimize exposure by the aerosol route.  The distance that pathogens can 
travel and be transmitted by aerosol is not completely understood, but experimentally, 
pathogens rarely travel more than 2 miles in air.7 Farms located within 1.25 miles of > 4 
farms were almost 3 times more likely to experience two or more respiratory disease 
outbreaks/year than farms located within 1.25 miles of 4 other farms.9 Herds within 3.2 km 
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of an infected herd had the highest risk for aerosol transmission of Mycoplasma
hyopneumoniae.10 Environmental and management practices are the most consistent means 
of control against respiratory disease, which is the main type of disease transmitted by 
aerosol.8   
Proper indoor air quality and ventilation practices are essential for swine health and 
well-being, in part, by diluting and removing harmful contaminants from buildings.11 Proper 
ventilation is important to reduce dust and feed particles in the air.  These particles can carry 
bacteria and viruses and can increase aerosol transmission of disease.11,12  Dust reduction 
protocols can be implemented, such as adding 1% fat to feed or sprinkling oil on building 
surfaces, which also decreases bacteria levels.13,14  It is important to ensure adequate air flow 
from a fresh source, thus displacing air that has high concentrations of organisms.8  Utilizing 
proper ventilation to keep humidity low (40-60%) can reduce the water droplets available for 
pathogens to travel in.8,12  Aerosol droplets with infectious agents in a low humidity 
environment will not allow the organisms to live; however, in an environment with moderate 
humidity, the pathogens can remain viable and infective.15  At very high humidity, the 
droplets will pick up water, increase in size, and precipitate out of the air, thus making it easy 
for transmission of the organisms.15  Overall, air quality depends on a number of factors 
including density, the cubic capacity of the building, the lower critical and upper critical 
temperatures, concentrations of gasses and levels of dust.15  Air quality can be monitored 
based on the content of certain gasses, particulate matter, and airborne microbes in the air 
around or in swine facilities.11           
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Air filtration systems are currently being used in higher health status herds (especially 
boar studs) to help minimize aerosol transmission of PRRSV.  The use of HEPA (99.97% 
DOP at  0.3 microns) filters in Europe and MERV 16 filters (95% DOP at  0.3 microns) in 
the U.S. has been quite successful in several operations.  High Efficiency Particulate Air 
(HEPA) and Minimum Efficiency Reporting Value (MERV) are standardized ways to rate 
the effectiveness of air filters with HEPA filtration having higher standards based on 
dispersed oil particulate (DOP) testing rate.  The PRRSV is about 0.065 microns small which 
is much smaller than the HEPA or MERV filters can handle.  But more important than 
particle size is how the virus is transported in aerosols.   Bioaerosols, generally 0.4 – 0.7 
microns in size, will be filtered out by these systems.  The cost of implementing an air 
filtration system including initial construction costs is between $180 - $200 per sow or 
boar.16  The use of filtration systems in grow-finish buildings is rare today due to the high 
costs.  As new and cheaper filter alternatives are developed, the use of this technology may 
dramatically increase.  The implementation of these filtration systems also requires a 
complete revamping of an operation’s entire BRM program as aerosol transmission of 
disease is not the main or only way for disease transmission to occur.   
Oral 
Oral transmission can occur through the consumption of contaminated feed, water, or 
any item in the environment that pigs may contact via their mouth.  Feed and water 
troughs/feeders, pen gating and other objects that pigs can gain access to and lick can serve 
as means for disease transmission via the oral route.  As a general rule, viruses do not 
replicate outside animals as they require living host cells, but bacteria can replicate quickly.  
107 
 
 
 
The average time for many bacteria to double in numbers is approximately 20 minutes, and 
an organism like Salmonella can increase in numbers from one organism per mL in liquid 
feed to up to 200,000 organisms per mL in just 48 hours at 82oF.17 The goal of mitigating 
oral transmission of disease involves minimizing or eliminating the opportunity for oral 
exposure to occur, as well as minimizing the pathogen load (fewer exposures with fewer 
organisms each time). 
Colostrum 
Piglet survival is highly dependent on receiving an adequate amount of colostrum 
from the dam.  Consuming colostrum which contains large amounts of the dam’s antibodies 
provides protection to the piglet during its first few weeks of life.  Colostrum would not be as 
important if we were able to place young pigs into a pathogen free environment.  But that is 
not possible in the production system.  Therefore, ensuring adequate colostrum intake helps 
to protect the piglet by providing immunity against some of the pathogens in the 
environment.  In an ideal world, every dam would produce enough colostrum for all her 
piglets, and every piglet would consume enough colostrum to provide adequate protection.  
However, in some cases, the dams do not milk well or piglets do not nurse.  Care needs to be 
taken when cross fostering piglets.  While this management technique has advantages of 
evening out litters, it also has a major health disadvantage of spreading disease.  Many 
experts would advise against cross fostering after the piglet is 24 hours old.  After 24 hours, 
the piglet may no longer be receiving colostrum from the dam to protect it against the 
pathogens that the nurse sow could be shedding.  
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Feedstuff 
Feed can serve as a possible source of pathogens (viruses and bacteria) as well as 
mycotoxins (toxins produced by fungi).  All operations should be very careful about 
acquiring products from clean sources as well as making sure that all diets are properly 
formulated to meet all macro and micro nutrient needs.  Operations need to ask their feed 
providers which procedures/tests are implemented on their end to ensure source ingredients 
are not contaminated.  Their testing protocols and frequency of testing are also important to 
know and verify (ask for reports).  Operations also need to have their own protocols for 
collecting feed samples from every feed delivery as well as a mechanism for periodic testing 
for pathogen contamination including mycotoxins.  Feed suppliers should have HACCP 
(Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points) programs implemented to ensure product 
quality.  Feed companies obtaining International Standard Organization certification (e.g. 
ISO 9000) are indications of verified high standards in production practices. 
Distillers Dried Grains (DDGs) 
From a disease standpoint, DDGs do not pose a risk of a disease introduction into a 
herd.  However, when utilizing DDGs in a swine ration, producers do need to be concerned 
about nutrient balancing and the quantity of mycotoxins that may be present in the feedstuff.  
Mycotoxins, especially aflatoxins, are known to suppress the immune system of animals, 
making them more susceptible to diseases.  Mycotoxins are concentrated some 3 times in 
DDGs.85, 86  Other mycotoxins such as zearalenone mimic estrogen and therefore can present 
in a sow herd as a reproductive failure issue that is non-infectious. 
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 Food Waste (Garbage) Feeding 
Feeding human food waste or garbage to livestock has occurred over the years 
evolving from a means to utilize household waste to utilizing food waste from restaurants, 
schools, nursing homes, and grocery stores.18  According to the USDA, there were 2.783 
licensed garbage feeders in the U.S. and nearly 1,964 in Puerto Rico (USDA-APHIS, VS, 
2008).  One concern related to feeding livestock food waste is the potential to transmit 
disease to the pigs, especially foreign animal diseases.  Therefore, food waste to be fed to 
pigs must be heat treated as mandated by the 1980 Swine Health Protection Act.  Heat treated 
garbage can only be fed from a facility in which the operator has a valid license for the 
treatment of garbage.19  However, regulations relating to food waste or garbage feeding can 
vary by state.  In a state which prohibits the feeding of garbage to swine, a license under the 
Act will not be issued to any applicant.19  Therefore, in some states, feeding treated or 
untreated waste is against the law.20 
Diseases may be spread to other livestock or humans if swine consume contaminated 
meat in improperly treated food waste.  Livestock diseases which may be transmitted to 
swine through food waste include classical swine fever, foot and mouth disease, African 
swine fever, and swine vesicular disease.  Other pathogens of concern that could spread to 
humans are Salmonella, Campylobacter, Trichinella, and Toxoplasma.  Food waste must be 
cooked as described below.18  
x Food waste shall be heated throughout at boiling (212°F or 100°C at sea level) for 30 
(thirty) minutes. 
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x It shall be agitated during cooking, except in the steam cooking equipment, to ensure 
that the prescribed cooking temperature is maintained throughout the cooking container 
for the prescribed length of time. 
It is the presence of meat in food waste that necessitates cooking; all table or plate 
scraps resulting from the handling, preparation, cooking, or consumption of food require 
cooking before feeding to swine (except for those produced and fed upon household 
premises).  The act does not require the cooking of non-meat food waste or byproduct items 
(e.g. bakery waste, vegetable waste, etc.). 
In 2009, an Interim Rule was adopted concerning the Swine Health Protection Act.  
This rule added another type of material to the list of exempted materials.  “Processed 
products” may be exempt from the cooking requirements.  According to the rule, if 
industrially processed products contain meat, they meet the definition of garbage and must be 
heated throughout at boiling or an equivalent temperature for 30 minutes to be eligible for 
feeding to swine.  However, in some cases, the procedures used to process such materials are 
controlled and monitored in such a way that it is possible for the processors of the materials 
to demonstrate that the materials have been heated throughout to at least 167oF for at least 30 
minutes, making the additional “margin of safety” of heating the material boiling 
unnecessary.21  
For production units utilizing food waste as a feedstuff for their animals, care needs 
to be taken to ensure the correct nutrient balance is maintained.  In many instances, the type 
of the food waste on a day by day basis may vary and, hence, so does the nutrients included 
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with that particular food waste.  If pigs aren’t maintained on a correctly balanced diet, 
production can be poor and diseases may be more of a concern. 
Spray-dried Animal Plasma (SDAP) 
The use of spray-dried animal plasma has become a nutrient source that more 
producers are trying.  Concern has been expressed over the possibility of this nutrient source 
spreading disease to pigs.  In a study published in the Journal of Animals Science in 2005, 
inclusion of SDAP in the diet improved growth of pigs without seroconversion.  Spray-
drying conditions used in this study were effective in eliminating viable pseudorabies and 
PRRSV from bovine plasma.22  Additionally, other studies have demonstrated that the higher 
drying temperatures for extended times eliminate viable pathogens for swine vesicular 
disease and classical swine fever viruses in addition to Salmonella and E. coli bacteria.  
Producers should make sure they acquire SDAP from a reputable source that has quality 
control measures in place to make sure drying temperatures and times are high enough to 
ensure viable pathogens have been eliminated. 
Water 
When considering the risk of water contamination, it is important to identify the 
source of water for each operation.  Rural water sources are safe for drinking as water must 
meet specifications for human consumption.  Deep well water is usually safe as natural 
filtering occurs.  However, some deep well water can contain high levels of bacteria, which 
generally cause a digestive upset to animals (and humans) when first exposed to the new 
water source.  The use of surface water (ponds, lakes, etc.) is a major concern for disease 
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transmission from birds and other wildlife.  Pathogens such as influenza viruses, 
leptospirosis, and avian tuberculosis are just a few that have been suspected to be transmitted 
to pigs though contaminated surface water. 
Water chlorination is used as a way to help kill pathogens in the water.  This is 
especially important when surface water is being used for drinking purposes on an operation.  
The process of water chlorination is simple, but it does require individual farm testing as the 
pH of water has a great effect on the ionization of the chlorine molecule.  It is the free 
chlorine which is active against the bacteria and viruses.  Routine testing of water 
chlorination on farm can be achieved through the use of swimming pool kits.   
The use of individual nipple waters is more likely to minimize disease spread via 
water.  Cup waters and especially troughs can serve as a source to spread pathogens between 
different animals  For example, PRRSV has been shown to have lasted for 11 days in a water 
system after pigs left the facility.23  The importance of disinfection between groups cannot be 
emphasized enough in order to prevent the spread of disease. 
Bedding 
In some production units such as hoop style structures, bedding is required.  Bedding 
can serve as a source of pathogen introduction.  The bedding, whether corn stalks, straw, 
wood chips or other material, needs to be from a pig-free source where it has been protected 
from birds and rodents.  The bedding could serve as a vector for pathogens to enter a herd, as 
well as transmit a disease between groups.  Care needs to be taken to remove all the bedding 
between groups, so as to prevent disease spread. 
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Although unusual, corn stalk bedding baled when containing high moisture may 
harbor high levels of mycotoxins.  As discussed in the DDG section, high levels of 
mycotoxins can affect the immune status as well as reproductive performance of the animals 
housed with this bedding source. 
Manure Handling 
Decontamination of manure pits is not practical on a routine basis, but may be 
necessary to reduce the risk of pathogen transmission when manure pits are contaminated.  
Long-term storage of manure for at least six months at 4ÛC without addition of new manure 
should reduce virus titers by 1 to 2 log10 units per month.  The Federal Ministry of 
Agriculture in Germany provides two options.  Forty to 60 liters of a 40% solution of lime 
hydrate per cubic meter of liquid manure can be used at temperatures between 0 and -10ÛC.  
Sixteen to 30 liters of a 50% solution of sodium hydroxide per cubic meter of liquid manure 
can be used at temperatures between 0 and 10ÛC.  Manure should be stirred prior to, during, 
and for 6 hours after chemical disinfection.  The duration of exposure of manure to chemicals 
should be at least 4 days and preferably 1 week.24 The PRRS virus can survive in lagoons for 
up to 14 days in 4ÛC,25,26 while IAV can survive up to nine weeks at similar temperatures.  
Some of the other pathogens that can survive in manure or lagoons include Ascaris suum, 
Brachyspira hyodysenteriae, Pseudorabies virus, Salmonella, and Transmissible 
Gastroenteritis virus (TGE).   
Direct Contact 
Direct pig-to-pig contact is one of the most effective methods of disease spread.  
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Litters may be combined in the nursery, pens are mixed in the grower and finisher, and sows 
and gilts may be penned together during part of the gestation period.  Any time animals come 
into contact with other animals, disease may be transmitted.  Pig-to-pig contact can be 
limited or minimized through a variety of management approaches.  Limiting pig-to-pig 
contact helps limit the exposure to any pathogens which are being shed at that time.  
Management approaches may include vaccination, changes to pig flow such as all-in all-out, 
herd closure, parity segregation, and isolation and acclimation procedures. 
Vaccination 
Vaccines are commonly used in swine production to mitigate the effects of disease 
and disease transmission.  There are many different products available in many different 
formulations and all have different strengths and weaknesses.  Vaccines can play a critical 
role in all BRM programs but it is important to remember that vaccines cannot prevent 
infection and therefore cannot be used as the sole prevention program.  All pork producers 
need to work very closely with their herd veterinarian in determining which vaccines they 
should use as well as when they need to be using them as part of their BRM planning.  It is 
also important to remember that pigs don’t all respond equally to vaccination.  This can be 
due to many reasons including, improper administration of the vaccine, nutritional 
differences, differences in stress levels, and simply biological variation in immune response.  
Pig Flow 
All-in-All-out 
All-in-all-out (AIAO) production is one of the greatest technologies that has been 
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implemented in the swine industry, having had a tremendous positive influence on the health 
status of animals.  The objective of AIAO is to group animals either on the basis of a room, 
barn, or site by which all animals in the group are completely moved out before the next 
group of animals is allowed to move in.  Being able to practice AIAO by site is better than by 
barn which is still better than by room.  In essence, this coordinated movement creates a 
break in pig flow.  This break in pig flow is critical for several reasons, the most important 
being that the new pigs will not be in contact with the previous group.  Pig-to-pig 
transmission is probably the greatest way to spread disease.  By removing the previous group 
of pigs before the next group arrives, a break in pig-to-pig disease transmission is created.  
Having a break also allows the area that these animals occupied (room, barn, or site) to be 
fully emptied so that cleaning and disinfection can be performed and the room allowed to 
dry.  Cleaning and disinfection will also be discussed in more detail later in the paper, but it 
is evident that by cleaning the environment and allowing it to dry, the amount of organisms 
the new group of animals could be exposed to is reduced. 
AIAO management has proven to be economically beneficial due to the ability to 
limit disease spread from one group of pigs to another.  AIAO production can improve the 
feed efficiency, weight gain, days-to-280 lbs, and respiratory health of pigs compared to 
continuous flow production.  In a study by Scheidt et al (1995),27 lung lesions at slaughter 
were 54% less prevalent and 80% less severe in pigs raised AIAO than the same source pigs 
raised under continuous flow conditions.  Average daily gain and feed efficiency were also 
significantly better in the AIAO group.  Other studies have shown that a $1-$5 savings per 
pig produced may be realized when using AIAO growing-finishing in remodeled facilities.27 
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Continuous Flow 
The opposite of AIAO is continuous flow in which animals are constantly being 
added to a group.  With continuous flow production, buildings or rooms are not completely 
emptied before new animals are brought in.  Producers vary with how they manage 
continuous flow production.  When pens are emptied, the pens may or may not be cleaned, 
disinfected and allowed to dry before filled with new animals.  Surrounding pens may remain 
filled with animals.  So, while the pen may be AIAO, the entire room or building is not.  
Therefore, animals which remain in the room or building may shed pathogens and infect the 
newly introduced animals.  The reverse may also be true.  The newly introduced animals may 
shed pathogens and infect the remaining animals.  Typically, older animals have been 
exposed to more pathogens than younger animals.  Therefore, when new younger animals are 
introduced into a continuous flow unit, these animals are exposed to the pathogens that the 
older animals are shedding.  Diseases tend to cycle through these rooms.  Disease can be 
difficult to control in a production unit when utilizing continuous flow methods.  For this 
reason, AIAO should be practiced at all times. 
Off-Site Production 
With the advent of AIAO production, it is important to create some separation by age 
with pig groups.  Because of this, many of today’s operations function with multiple sites 
each specialized in a different stage of production.  From a BRM standpoint alone, ideally, 
one would be able to have two or three sites of production.  Site 1 is considered the breeding 
and gestation herd.  Pigs are kept on this site until weaning time; then they will move to site 
117 
 
 
 
2.  If site 2 is a wean-to-finish site, pigs will remain there until market.  If site 2 is a nursery-
only site, pigs are moved to a finishing site (site 3) at a later date.  Being able to completely 
go AIAO by site in both nurseries and finishing buildings can be very beneficial in helping 
break disease cycles.  Many operations are not able to go completely AIAO by site and then 
have to rely on going AIAO by building.  Finally, if AIAO by building is not possible, there 
are still advantages for trying to go AIAO by room. 
Early Weaning 
Early weaning may include many different approaches such as isowean, segregated 
early weaning, and medicated early weaning.  The concept behind early weaning is that the 
pig consumes colostrum from the dam which helps protect it against disease.  While the pig 
is protected with the antibodies from the colostrum, it is weaned and moved into a clean 
facility where it is less likely to be exposed to pathogens.  If the pig remains with the dam, 
eventually the colostral antibodies will no longer be protective, and there is a greater risk of 
disease transmission vertically from the dam to the pig.  With that in mind, producers have 
weaned pigs at varying ages trying to determine when the pigs can be taken from the dam 
and thrive on their own, while reducing the risk of becoming infected with pathogens from 
the dam.  Several bacterial diseases have been eliminated in today’s production systems 
through the early weaning of pigs.  At times, pigs will be weaned as young as 7-10 days of 
age instead of 18-21 days of age.  At weaning, pigs are moved to a separate site that has been 
treated as AIAO.  Under special circumstances, early weaned pigs will be treated with 
antibiotics to maximize the probability of eliminating certain bacterial pathogens, termed 
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medicated early weaning.  Production units that utilize early weaning do so as a method to 
control disease, and strict AIAO needs to be adhered to.  It is important to realize that 
although some pathogens can be controlled or even eliminated through early weaning, others 
cannot (including PRRSV, Streptococcus suis, Haemophilus parasuis).  Diseases not 
eliminated by early weaning are usually associated with infected fetuses being born (in-utero 
transmission) or transmission at the time of birth, such as in the case of S. suis.28 
Herd Closure   
Of course, one way to eliminate disease introduction into a herd through replacement 
animals would be to close the herd.  The concept of herd closure is just as it sounds.  The 
herd would be closed to the introduction of new live animal genetic stock and to animals 
leaving and returning to the farm for any reason.  As with any management approach, herd 
closure has its advantages and disadvantages.  While closing the herd eliminates the 
introduction of disease through replacement animals and returning animals, the herd is 
unable to introduce new genetic stock.  The herd would need to devise a system in which 
they produce all their own replacement animals.  Semen can be utilized from outside sources, 
but in many cases, a herd would need to maintain two genetic lines.  Semen from maternal 
lines may be used to produce replacement animals for the herd while semen from terminal 
lines would be used to produce market animals.  Herd closure requires managing these two 
sets of animals differently in most cases.  However, the benefit would be to eliminate disease 
entry from replacement animals.   
From a disease standpoint, when a herd is closed to eliminate an existing disease, a 
119 
 
 
 
key objective for herd closure is to eliminate susceptible populations (i.e. young pigs) on the 
same site.  In this sense, herd closure will occur for a specific time period and cannot go on 
indefinitely as new breeding stock (either purchased or home raised) will need to be 
introduced at some time point.  If a herd is to be closed to eliminate an existing disease, it 
must ship all weaned animals off-site during this period of closure.  Even if this is a farrow-
to-finish site, weaned pigs must be removed from the site.  This will create a break in pig age 
which is critical in creating a gap in new susceptible animals.  This break in susceptible 
animals is vital in eliminating the opportunity for the disease to find new animals to infect 
and therefore the disease will “burn out” with time.  Proper planning to discuss how 
replacement animals can be managed is critical to the success of the operation.  Having off-
site locations where replacement gilts can be developed and possibly even be bred can help 
minimize breeding herd down time.  A key consideration will be evaluating the risk of 
having off-site animals exposed to different disease or strains.  Once the herd is re-opened for 
animal introductions, these off-site animals need to be brought into the farm just like all other 
replacement animals, requiring a minimum of 30 days of isolation. 
The duration of the herd closure for disease purposes will be dependent on the 
pathogens that are targeted for control/elimination.  For example for PRRSV, many have 
identified that 200 days from the last known exposure is needed for better success rates.  That 
means that for 200 days, no animals will be allowed to enter the herd.  Herd closures for less 
than 200 days can be successful, but field reports indicate they are less likely to be 
successful. 
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Parity Segregation 
Parity segregation involves separating gilts from sows.  The pigs from gilts’ litters are 
also separated from sows’ offspring in the nursery.  Production units that practice parity 
segregation do so out of concern that the gilts’ pigs may be infected with more pathogens 
than older sows’ pigs.  If the older sow has been exposed to more pathogens and has built up 
better immunity, she will pass that protection on to her piglets in the colostrum.  However, a 
gilt, which has not been exposed to as many pathogens, may not pass the colostral protection 
on to her pigs. 
Providing sufficient facility space is a limiting factor for some production units when 
considering parity segregation.  The success of parity segregation can be maximized by 
keeping the offspring from these gilts separate from older parity offspring throughout all of 
the growing phases. 
Replacement Animals and Animals Returning to the Farm 
When replacement animals need to be introduced into a herd, care should to be taken 
to reduce the risk of disease introduction to the main herd.  Anytime new animals are brought 
into a herd, a risk of disease introduction is possible.  Veterinarians should always conduct a 
“Vet-to-Vet” consult before any new animals are purchased for additions to a herd.  This is 
especially true regarding breeding stock animals.  Care should also be taken when animals 
from a herd leave to attend an exhibition and then return to the original herd.  During the 
exhibition, animals are exposed to a large number of other pigs as well as humans which can 
all pose as a source of infection to pigs at the show.  A study of Australian pig shows in 2006 
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indicated that pigs were 40 times more likely to be fed swill (human food including meat) by 
the public than by staff or exhibitors even considering the biosecurity concerns of foot and 
mouth disease and classical swine fever in that country.29 Awareness of human influenza 
transmission from humans to pigs was raised in 2009.  Not only was there concern that pigs 
carry influenza and could possibly transmit it to people, but also the pigs could be exposed to 
influenza from the human visitors.  Animals returning home or replacement animals 
introduced into a herd can carry new pathogens or isolates onto the production site.  
Protocols need to be in place and followed to minimize the risk of a herd becoming infected 
with one of these pathogens.  Incoming animals should never be allowed to enter into the 
herd directly and be co-mingled with herd animals. 
Of course, the risk of exposure varies with the potential pathogen.  However, one has 
no way of knowing which pathogens other animals may be shedding at an exhibition.  When 
purchasing replacement animals, sellers should provide information on the health of the 
swine, such as routine vaccination and worming procedures, and diagnostic results, so that 
their suitability for the herd can be assessed; and where necessary, appropriate treatments and 
vaccinations administered.  This information is usually obtained from a “Vet-to-Vet” consult.   
When either a herd purchases replacement animals from more than one source or the 
exhibition animals return home from multiple shows, the risk of pathogen exposure increases 
for the herd.  For example, studies have shown that herds purchasing stock from more than 
one source per year were almost three times more likely to become infected with 
Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae than herds purchasing from a single source.30  A study by Maes 
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et al (2001)31 also identified frequency of gilt replacements as a risk factor for lung lesions at 
slaughter house in farrow-to-finish herds.   
While incoming animals may not appear to be showing any signs of disease, they 
may be carrying the disease, otherwise known as incubation.  The incubation period is the 
time between when an animal becomes infected and when that animal shows signs of 
disease.  In some cases, many days may pass before an infected animal shows signs of 
disease.  One model estimated that six to 30 days would pass before clinical signs of TGE 
were detected in a herd after the introduction of a single carrier pig.32  Isolating incoming 
animals prior to introduction into the herd minimizes the risk of disease entry.33 The duration 
of the isolation period can vary greatly between farms but should always be a minimum of 30 
days.  Factors which determine the length of the isolation period include the health of the 
farm from which the replacement animals come and the health status of the receiving farm.  
Animals returning from an exhibition could be exposed to a large number of pathogens, 
therefore, making their isolation period longer.  During isolation, animals can be observed for 
clinical signs of disease, tested for pathogens they may be carrying, and acclimated to 
organisms already present in the breeding herd.33  Diligence needs to be taken when caring 
for animals in isolation.  Because they may be carrying and shedding various pathogens, 
employees responsible for these animals need to take care of them at the end of the day and 
not return to the main herd until the following day.  Separate coveralls and boots may be left 
at the facility.  Equipment utilized in the isolation facility should remain there and not be 
utilized in the other buildings, so as not to risk carrying diseases on the equipment from 
isolation animals to those in the main herd.  
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Where should an isolation facility be located in relation to the main herd?  This is a 
great question which has been debated with no scientific data to give a precise location.  On 
some production sites, the isolation unit is located in a room of one of the buildings or may 
be its own separate building located off site.  Keeping some physical separation is helpful in 
emphasizing these units need to be treated differently.  Unfortunately, the layout of the site 
might restrict the separation distances as well as the actual location for this facility.  No 
matter what the location is, many experts do agree that the isolation facility should be treated 
as being separate from the main herd.  Therefore, this facility should have its own feeding 
system, manure disposal, and attention to the personnel caring for the animals.   
While placing animals in isolation helps to protect your herd, those newly introduced 
animals can also become infected with pathogens present on your farm.  Acclimatization 
introduces new breeding stock to viral and bacterial pathogens present on the receiving 
farm.33 Acclimatization may be done in the same facility as isolation, although with only one 
group of animals at a time.34 The Swine 200033 study found that 84.1% of sites that isolated 
new breeding females vaccinated them as part of the acclimatization process.  Other practices 
used commonly to acclimate gilts were: exposure to cull females (49.0% of sites); feedback 
of feces from other swine (25.1% of sites); feedback of mummies/placentas/stillborns (11.3% 
of sites); and exposure to sick pigs (7.7% of sites). 
The vaccination schedule for replacement animals can be arranged with the herd 
veterinarian.34  The vaccines utilized will vary by herd depending on the diseases present in 
the herd, diseases affecting animals in the area, and vaccines available and their efficacy.  
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The duration of the acclimation period is dependent on the disease of greatest concern.  
Because of PRRSV, many facilities today utilize at least 60 days of acclimation to allow 
animals to be fully exposed to the virus as well as “cool down” (stop shedding virus) before 
they can be introduced to the rest of the herd. 
Throughout the isolation and acclimation periods serologic monitoring can be utilized 
as a tool to determine the immune status or possible exposure of the animals to various 
diseases.  Blood can be collected and tested for a variety of diseases.  In many cases, 
collecting samples and testing for the immune response to a disease at different points in time 
help determine the exposure of an animal and how their body is responding to that disease.  
For example, when replacement animals arrive on site, samples may be collected to detect 
their immune status to diseases that the veterinarian or producer is concerned about.  Some 
animals may have a low titer, high titer or no titer evident at that time.  Therefore, in many 
situations, the animals are retested 2-4 weeks later, and their titers compared.  The immune 
response of those same animals may look different at that time.  Now, the replacement 
animals need to be exposed to the diseases that are currently present in the main herd.  Again, 
serologic monitoring is a useful tool to determine when and if the exposed animals are 
mounting an adequate immune response to the diseases of concern as well as to make sure 
the animals are not shedding virus (viremic) so as to be able to enter the main herd.  
In many instances, to minimize the time needed for isolation/acclimation, some 
operations will actually start the acclimation process shortly after the animals arrive on farm 
at the same time that the isolation period is going on.  Strictly speaking, from a BRM 
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standpoint, focusing on external biosecurity is not the best practice.  Animals are being 
exposed to the site’s own agents shortly after arrival.  It will become difficult to differentiate 
clinical signs due pathogens external to the operation (bad) or those already present in the 
operation (good).  An operation needs to evaluate the benefits vs. the risks of running 
concurrent isolation/acclimation periods. 
Age at entry is dependent on the health status of incoming animals as compared to the 
health status of the recipient herd.  Some veterinarians are recommending entry as early 
weaned pigs.  This decreases the likelihood of introducing new diseases (as animals have less 
time to get exposed to different agents) and allows ample time for the pigs to become 
acclimated to the recipient herd’s diseases.  When the pigs are acclimated or exposed to the 
recipient herd’s diseases, they will have plenty of time to get over the disease and stop 
shedding the disease agents.  Farms with limited isolation facilities on-site have tended 
towards more traditional age at entry (60 days prior to breeding).  A successful 
isolation/acclimatization program does not allow disease to get from the isolation unit to the 
main herd while fully exposing these new animals to all pathogens already present on farm. 
The cleaning and disinfection of isolation facilities is a controversial topic, as these 
facilities are usually used for acclimation purposes as well.  On one hand, the goal of 
acclimation is to expose animals to pathogens already present on the farm.  By cleaning and 
disinfecting the isolation/acclimation facility, disease exposure is minimized.  On the other 
hand, not cleaning the facility can create an environment that may be too contaminated, 
which in turn, could overwhelm the replacement gilt’s immune system and create clinical 
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disease.  It may be appropriate to clean the isolation/acclimation facility possibly once or 
twice a year.  This would allow continuation of disease exposure without overwhelming the 
system too much.  The buildup of manure is also tough on equipment, so some cleaning will 
extend the life of the facility/equipment.  If a facility is used strictly as an isolation facility, it 
is imperative that it be fully cleaned and disinfected between groups to prevent disease 
exposure from one group to the next.  It is also important to note that if, at any time, the 
isolation/acclimation building has to be emptied because of unexpected disease exposure, the 
facility must be fully cleaned and disinfected before the next group of animals is allowed to 
enter. 
Semen 
Artificial insemination (AI) reduces the risk of disease transfer between the boar and 
breeding female.  However, certain pathogens can be transmitted in semen.33 Parvovirus, 
PRRSV, Brucella, pseudorabies virus, and many other disease agents have been isolated 
from semen of infected boars.35 
Currently 90% + of all breeding on farms is done via artificial insemination.  This has 
allowed for quicker genetic advancements and more efficient use of boars.  This broad 
practice makes semen a significant risk for spreading diseases simultaneously to many 
different operations.   
Porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus can be transmitted via fresh and 
diluted semen, and infected boars can become long-term carriers of the virus.36 Currently, the 
U.S. boar industry is focused primarily on PRRSV transmission via semen.  Boars can shed 
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PRRSV in semen as early as 3 days after infection,37  they do not necessarily show clinical 
signs and they can test positive via polymerase chain reaction testing (PCR) for up to 92 
days.37  Boar studs need to be monitored routinely for PRRSV. 
There are many other important swine pathogens that have been found in semen from 
infected boars.  Although PRRSV is currently the biggest concern in the U.S., awareness of 
other pathogens is important.  Very few boar studs currently test for other pathogens other 
than PRRSV.  For example, leptospirosis has been reported in swine from all parts of the 
world.  The disease mainly causes reproductive problems in breeding herds (abortion, 
stillborn piglets and infertility).  Clinical symptoms and infertility may also occur in acutely 
infected boars.  Venereal transmission is thought to play an important role in the spread of 
infections.38 
The PCV2 virus has also been linked to a number of other disease conditions, 
including reproductive failure (late term abortions and stillbirths).  However, PCV2-
associated reproductive disease under field conditions does not seem to be common.39 
To prevent possible spread of infectious diseases via AI, several precautionary 
measures should be undertaken in AI centers.  First, individual hygiene and general 
sanitation procedures are important.  Personnel collecting semen or coming into contact with 
any materials need to understand that they can be a source of contamination or act as a carrier 
in transferring contamination.  To minimize the bacterial load originating from the boar, the 
ventral abdomen should be clean and dry.  Preputial fluids, which can contain high numbers 
of microbes, should be evacuated prior to exteriorization of the penis for semen collection.  
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Detailed lists of measures that can be taken to minimize the risk of contamination are 
reported by Althouse et al.40 To reduce the unavoidable presence of bacteria in the ejaculate 
and to prolong in vitro longevity of sperm, preservative levels of antimicrobials are an 
essential constituent of any semen extender.  Apart from a possible dilution effect of 
pathogens, semen processing and addition of antimicrobials, however, do not eliminate 
viruses.  Monitoring for bacterial contamination of the extended semen samples may 
constitute an important part of a control program.  Harmless organisms that have no negative 
influence on sperm quality and sow herds do not need to be monitored, unless they exceed a 
certain threshold or would have an indicator function. 
The health status of the animals should be checked daily.  However, as indicated 
before, clinical examination alone is insufficient, since clinically normal boars can shed 
pathogens (e.g. CSF virus, FMDV, PRRSV, PRV, and Brucella suis) in their semen.  
Vaccination of the boars can be considered for some pathogens; for example, vaccination 
against parvovirus may help to reduce shedding of the virus following infection. 
Disease surveillance in boar studs is a continuous process.  Animals are constantly 
being monitor by testing the semen (especially for bacteria) as well as the blood (especially 
for PRRSV).  Diligence is necessary in these facilities as they have potential to infect a large 
number of sows if a disease agent is shed in the semen.  Serologic monitoring is utilized on a 
regular basis as part of the protocol of disease surveillance in these facilities.  It is critical that 
all operations purchasing semen from outside their production unit utilize a source that is 
reputable and progressive in their disease monitoring.  It is important to know the exact 
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monitoring program the stud implements to better evaluate the operation’s risk for disease 
introduction through semen.  Relationships with the boar stud should also be strong enough 
that the operation and its veterinarian are kept informed of any changes in their monitoring 
program.  Periodic communications with the stud can help make sure monitoring programs 
are being implemented as planned.  As with all BRM programs, there is no single perfect 
program that will eliminate all risks.  The goal of all BRM programs is to minimize and 
mitigate as much risk as possible.  All monitoring program do add costs to the production of 
semen.   
Fomites 
Facilities and Equipment 
Fomites include objects such as equipment for sorting and treating animals, feeders, 
boots, and clothing that can become contaminated with pathogens and infect another animal.  
Survival of an infectious dose of a pathogen on fomites and subsequent transmission to a 
susceptible host is dependent on many factors.  Some pathogens do not survive outside of the 
pig.  Others can survive for weeks or longer in manure.41 
Care must be taken to minimize the risk of disease introduction or the occurrence of 
disease spread via fomite contamination.  One way to reduce this risk is through good 
sanitation.  Therefore, diligence and attention to detail is essential.  Equipment needs to be 
washed thoroughly to remove all manure and dirt that is present.  A study by Kauffold et al 
(2005)42 showed that ultrasound equipment used in swine operations is commonly 
contaminated with both bacteria as well as PRRSV residues.  Although this study did not 
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demonstrate whether this PRRSV was infective or not, it did show that equipment can 
become contaminated even when plastic or household cling-film is used.  This study 
highlights the importance of minimizing the sharing of equipment, even valuable equipment, 
between farms.   
Another important area that may be overlooked is equipment which comes into direct 
contact with animals.  This is especially true regarding equipment used to process baby pigs 
(e.g. tail docking and castration).  Work by Alvarez et al in 200243 demonstrated that dipping 
equipment momentarily in Nolvasan® disinfectant did not significantly reduce the median 
aerobic bacterial counts on the cutting blades of the equipment.  Wiping the blades with a 
clean cloth was actually quite effective.  This study highlights the contact time disinfectants 
need to be effective.  To allow for sufficient contact time, different sets of equipment need to 
be used in a rotational basis.  It probably will not be practical to allow for equipment to be 
fully disinfected between each pig, but longer contact time can be achieved by switching 
equipment between litters of pigs.  Although the use of a clean towel was quite effective 
under research conditions, it would be hard in a regular field setting to have a clean cloth 
available at all times. 
Some pathogens can survive in and be spread through dirt and manure contamination.  
After the dirt and manure are removed, an effective disinfectant should be utilized.  Which 
disinfectant is most effective on this farm?  That is a tough question.  While pathogens on 
each farm vary, some disinfectants are more effective against certain pathogens.44 Review the 
labels on the disinfectants currently being used.  Are the farm pathogens of concern listed on 
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the label?  If not, review labels of other disinfectants to see if there is a disinfectant that will 
kill the pathogen of interest.  After a disinfectant has been selected, follow the directions on 
how to best utilize the disinfectant to kill the pathogen.  Using the product too diluted or not 
allowing for enough contact time can reduce the effectiveness of the product.   
The ideal disinfectant has the following characteristics:45  
x  Proven broad-spectrum activity and efficacy under farm conditions 
x  Fast acting to rapidly kill highly infectious agents 
x  Temperature stable and active at extremes of heat or cold 
x  Stable after dilution, especially for footbaths 
x  Suitable for porous and non-impervious surfaces 
x  Active in the presence of organic matter 
x  Versatile for use in footbaths, vehicles and surfaces 
x  Safe for environment, animals and operative staff 
x  Government approved for notifiable diseases 
x  Easy to store 
x  Cost effective 
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Footbaths are another effective way of preventing disease transmission if used 
properly.  In some cases, footbaths serve their purpose of reducing the risk of spreading 
disease that may be present on boots into a facility.  However, many times that is not the 
case.  Employees and visitors are busy and may bypass the footbath by stepping over it or 
quickly stepping through it on their way into the facility.  The disinfectants used in footbaths 
are not effective if there is contamination on the boots or if contact time of the disinfectant on 
the boot is inadequate.  Therefore, for a footbath to be effective, contamination should be 
scrubbed off boots before the footbath is used.  A boot brush should be available, so that 
before personnel step into the footbath, manure and contamination can be removed.  Also, 
the brush will apply disinfectant on all surfaces of the boot while standing in the footbath.  
Scrubbing plays a major role in decontamination of boots as shown in Table 2 below.46,47    
Selection of a proper disinfectant not inactivated by organic material as well as maintenance 
of the footbaths is another concern.48,47,49  At any given time on many farms, one could 
inspect footbaths and find that a majority are poorly maintained, containing contamination.  
Footbaths need to be cleaned with fresh disinfectant added on a daily basis to be effective.   
133 
 
 
 
Table 2.  Bacterial counts from sole of boots after respective treatments 47 
Treatment Mean bacterial count 
No foot bath 2.78 X 108  
Step though disinfectant 1.76 X 108 
Stand in disinfectant for 2 min 2.59 X 107 
Scrub in disinfectant for 30 sec 20 
Scrub in water for 30 sec 1.04 X 105 
Scrub in water for 30 sec then step through disinfectant 120 
 
Aside from correctly cleaning and disinfecting all fomites, several other procedures 
can be utilized to reduce the risk of disease transmission.  If possible, avoid sharing 
equipment among premises.  When treating sick animals, utilize new needles and clean 
snares and sorting panels between animals if possible.  Handle biologics aseptically.  
Disposable boots and coveralls are a great alternative when visiting different sites.  Caution 
must be taken when removing these for disposal as accidental contamination of the hands can 
occur.50 For operations with different sites, having a set of boots and coveralls that stay at 
each site can also be very helpful in mitigating the transmission of disease between sites. 
Some operations require anyone (except for on-site employees) getting out of their 
vehicles to have some type of disposable foot covering such as plastic boots.  These plastic 
boots are placed over footwear while still inside the vehicle just before taking the first step on 
the ground.  The use of this protective covering will minimize the opportunity of any 
contamination from having direct contact with the site traffic area. 
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Not all boots are created equal.  When purchasing boots, it is very helpful to look at 
the tread on the bottom of the boots.  Each brand has a different pattern.  There are also great 
differences in how easy these boots can be cleaned.  Boots with a very narrow tread are very 
difficult to clean even when using a brush.  This is especially true when you have been 
walking on these boots for some time and the manure/dirt has been compacted heavily in 
these crevices.  Boots with wide tread are much easier to clean thoroughly.  This will speed 
up the cleaning time, and most likely improve your BRM compliance as well.  It may also be 
helpful to use different color boots (and coveralls) for different sites or purposes.  For 
example, blue boots and red coveralls are to be used when taking animals to the dead pile 
(rendering, compost or incinerator).  This helps with compliance in different ways.  First of 
all, it serves as a reminder for all employees that changes in clothing and boots are necessary.  
It also allows anyone from a distance to know whether proper BRM practices are being 
followed.  Employees are also aware that others can identify when they do not follow 
protocol; and therefore, they themselves are more likely to follow the rules.  The hassle with 
dealing with special orders and different suppliers does make it more difficult to implement 
these color codes, but the benefit of a better BRM program are definitely worth it. 
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Regarding people and fomites, the following summarizes from the safest practice to 
the most risky: 
x Shower-in and shower-out with complete change in boots and coveralls Safest 
x Change in boots and coveralls and washing hands 
x Change in boots and coveralls 
x Change in boots 
x Simply “clean & disinfect” boots worn elsewhere          Most risky 
 
The concept of shower-in and shower-out will be discussed in greater detail under the 
employee section of the BRM.  Hand washing is the single most important measure to reduce 
the risk of disease transmission to humans.  It is also a great way to minimize the spread of 
disease from animal to animal.  Hands should be washed between different animal contacts 
(different age, different barns, different sites) and after contact with secretions, excretions, or 
tools/equipment contaminated by them.  Hands should also be washed before working in the 
office or eating.  Proper installations (sink and water supply) and supplies (soap and towels) 
are critical in making sure workers have good access to hand washing equipment as well as 
ensure their use. 
Besides boots and coveralls being a source of contamination, other equipment and 
supplies arrive almost daily.  The risk of disease transmission from these is unknown.  
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Research by Dee et al (2002) has shown that cardboard boxes can become contaminated with 
PRRSV especially in the winter when the virus can survive longer in snow.51  This snow can 
melt once inside the building which can then serve as a source of contamination to anything 
placed on the floor.51   Because of the risk supplies and equipment can pose to an operation, 
several BRM techniques can be implemented.  Probably the most common one is a double 
bagging system.  With this system, operations will ask supplier to double bag everything they 
purchase.  Once arriving to the farm, the outside bag will be opened and the inside bag will 
then be grabbed from someone in the clean side to carry in the supplies.  This will prevent 
the box and outside bag from entering the facility as they are considered dirty.  For larger 
pieces of equipment, this practice is not practical.  A second method used by some operations 
is to build a small room where all products entering the facility can be fumigated with a 
proper disinfectant.  This process does require a special room as well as means to make sure 
that the fumigation plume reaches all of the outside surfaces of all equipment.  This is 
difficult to do in one step as all supplies need to be placed on some type of heavy duty screen 
so provide better access to the bottom of the equipment/supplies.  To alleviate this, many 
operations will actually run the fumigation process twice with a rotation of all 
supplies/equipment occurring once between each of the fumigations.  For equipment/ 
supplies too large to fit in the fumigation room, a simple manual decontamination process 
needs to occur. 
Loading 
The loading area can prove to be an area of disease exposure for any farm.  Design 
and location should be carefully considered to ensure that any vehicles loading or unloading 
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pigs are kept on the dirty side of the unit.  In fact, some production units designate areas as a 
clean area and a dirty area with an actual painted line separating the two areas.  This painted 
line serves as a continuous reminder that a separation is necessary to maximize BRM.  
Personnel and equipment in the clean area must stay on the clean side while the truck driver 
and any loading equipment from his truck must remain on the dirty side.  Once an animal 
crosses over from the clean side to the dirty side, it must not be allowed to turn back.  The 
same is true for employees.  If a production employee crosses over the line, they must re-
enter the facility by following the set protocol which may include showering, changing 
coveralls and boots, or hand washing as if they were entering for the first time that day.   
Materials used for the loading bay must be easy to clean and disinfect.  The truck 
driver should wear clean clothes and boots each time, especially with each individual farm.  
The loading facility should be washed and disinfected, ideally after each use, and should not 
drain into the building.  If cleaning of the load-out facilities is done by farm personnel, 
cleaning should be done at the end of the day so that personnel do not need to re-enter the 
building that day.34 
Ideally, every load-out should be constructed to prevent entry by truck drivers.  Load-
out areas should have a roof and fencing installed to the roof’s edge.  The chute gate should 
have a guillotine mechanism which prevents animals from re-entering the load-out holding 
area.  “Sacred zones” should be designated to truck drivers by management.  These areas are 
strictly off limits to the drivers.52 It is extremely helpful to have a great working relationship 
with your truck driver so they, too, are very familiar with your BRM practices without 
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requiring a full explanation every time someone shows up to deliver or load-out hogs. 
Transport Vehicles 
Many trucks enter and exit a production site in one day.  Feed trucks, delivery 
vehicles, farm employees, veterinarians, and trucks to load-out pigs can all put a production 
site at risk for disease exposure.  The recovery of Salmonella from the truck swabs taken in 
one study suggest that feed trucks might serve as a potential source of contamination.17  A 
1995 study by Bech-Nielsen et al. suggested that PRV virus was transported from swine 
markets to farms, by either the farmer or trucker.53 Proper sanitation methods between loads, 
including washing with a disinfectant and hot water, should be implemented to minimize the 
likelihood that the truck would contribute to contamination of subsequent loads.17 Vehicles 
can potentially transmit swine pathogens when manure containing disease agents are adhered 
to tires or the vehicle frame.  There is evidence that Actinobacillus pleuropneumoniae, TGE, 
PRRSV, and Streptococcus suis can be spread by contaminated vehicles.35,54 
It is recommended that vehicles be specifically designated for different jobs.  For 
example, a trailer that is used to move animals within a farm should be different than the one 
used to deliver pigs outside the farm.  A trailer used to transport isowean pigs should be 
different than the one that is used to take market pigs or cull animals to slaughter.  Some 
larger systems also separate their transport vehicles into PRRSV status as much as possible.  
Transport trailers are dedicated for animal movements to and from PRRSV negative systems.  
If a PRRSV negative trailer has to be used in a PRRSV positive system, the trailer will then 
have to undergo additional cleaning and disinfection steps and also be required to have down 
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time so it can completely dry before it is allowed back into the PRRSV negative system.  The 
more specific and dedicated tasks that trailers can be assigned, the less likely it will be that 
they can serve as a fomite for disease transmission, while still maintaining some operational 
effectiveness. 
Providing an enclosed, well lit, and heated building for shelter will greatly improve 
the quality of the washing.  Federal regulations require that all the wastewater be captured in 
an approved holding facility.  If bedding is used, it must be held until it can be disposed of 
properly or applied to agriculture land.  Proper slope for washing out the trailer is necessary.  
A minimum of 2% to 3% slope to get the wash water to run out is recommended.  A pressure 
washer with high pressure and hot water is needed.  Recommendations include using a 
minimum of 2,000 psi with 4 gallon per minute of water.  An accurate metering device is 
important in the application of the soap and disinfectant. 
Trucks which arrive on the farm contaminated with manure should be excused from 
the property and invited to return when the trailer has been cleaned and disinfected.52 All 
employees on a farm, regardless of their position, should have the authority to reject any 
vehicle that is not clean. 
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Procedures for Cleaning and Disinfecting Transport Vehicles:55,56 
1. Bedding and large debris should be completely removed before 
entering the wash area.   
2. The use of detergents is highly recommended to reduce washing time 
by loosening debris.  Normally it is applied on low pressure and by soaking the entire 
trailer at once.  This will provide some time to loosen debris.  However, don’t allow 
the soap to dry or it will be harder to rinse. 
3. Start rinsing and cleaning the trailer from the top down.  The trailer 
cab must not be forgotten. 
4. Rinse and clean each deck from front to back and ceiling down starting 
with the top deck.  All trailer areas and equipment need to be fully cleaned including 
unloading ramps, sorting boards, paddles, and boots after every load. 
5. After the trailer has been rinsed inside and out, apply the disinfectant 
at the appropriate dilution rate.  Start on the inside of the trailer and finish on the 
outside.  Disinfectant should be applied at low pressure because many of the metering 
devices will not dilute properly on high pressure. 
6. Clean out the inside of the cab.  Wash and disinfect the floor mats. 
7. After disinfection, park the truck on a slope so all the remaining water 
can drain out.  Allow enough time for the trailer to fully dry. 
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The disinfectant and cleaning protocol a system uses depends on many factors 
including the diseases present on the farm, the stage of production of the animals hauled, 
where the animals were hauled to, and what the trailer will be used for next.  Dee et al (2006)  
tested a protocol using conditions found on commercial swine production units, for sanitation 
of 1:150 scale models of commercial transport vehicles contaminated with PRRSV.57  The 
group concluded that high-pressure washing of transport trailers, followed by 90 to 120 
minutes exposure to either modified potassium monopersulfate or quaternary ammonium 
chloride disinfectants applied with a hydrofoamer is likely to eliminate residual infectious 
PRRSV.57   
Following sanitation, the vehicle must be allowed adequate drying time after 
disinfection.  As with facilities, this is the most important step in the sanitation protocol to 
completely inactivate the virus.  The use of high volume warm air can decrease the amount 
of time needed for drying.  The Thermo-Assisted Drying and Decontamination (TADD) 
system developed by PIC is recommended to achieve a dry trailer in the shortest amount of 
time.  Studies have indicated that 120 minutes of high volume warm air applied via the 
TADD method can effectively remove PRRSV from contaminated surfaces in transport 
trailers.25 One system heats and holds at a minimum of 142oF for 10 minutes before flushing 
with fresh air.58 
The use of truck-mounted tire sanitizers have also been evaluated for effectiveness in 
minimizing bacterial contamination found in tires.  Although this type of system theoretically 
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should be effective, two different studies have shown that there is too much variability in 
bacterial contamination during different seasons and therefore their effectiveness is hard to 
prove.  Cold weather conditions also make it challenging to consistently implement.59,60 
Aside from implementing biosecurity measures to keep trucks clean, controlling 
traffic is another way to control disease entry.  Installing a perimeter fence can prevent 
uninvited visitors, whether human or animal, from entering your production site.  Keeping 
the fence locked also controls entry of vehicles and allows for employees to monitor those 
vehicles entering the site.  Entry can be limited to only select individuals.  Also, all trucks 
can be inspected for cleanliness.  Any truck which does not pass inspection can be refused 
entry.  Keeping the gate locked and having an employee unlock the gate for those entering, 
does allow that employee to monitor whose driving onto the site.  If no gating is available, 
then proper signage at the entrance of the site is critical in helping limit traffic.  Although 
signs will not prevent unauthorized entry, they will help limit access to those who 
unintentionally would be wandering on-site. 
Parking 
Restricting entrance to the site as well as establishing an area for designated parking 
is very helpful in controlling traffic on site.  Placing the parking area in an obvious location, 
preferably with signage, will prevent visitors from pulling their vehicles too close to 
livestock buildings.  This is especially true during inclement weather when people’s 
tendencies are to minimize their discomfort without thinking about the risks posed to the 
livestock.  Having vehicle traffic close to where animals are located can increase the risk for 
143 
 
 
 
disease transmission including aerosol transmission. 
Employees 
Employees provide another conduit for pathogen entry into a production site.  
Research has proven that diseases such as foot and mouth disease (FMD), Mycoplasma 
hyopneumoniae, and IAV have been transmitted from people to pigs.  People wearing 
clothing or boots contaminated with manure from sick animals can be a source of 
pathogens.35 However, exposure doesn’t only occur through contaminated clothing and 
boots.  People can carry pathogens on their skin or in nasal passages.  Sellers et al.  (1971) 
reported that FMDV could be transferred by human beings, from infected pigs, to susceptible 
cattle.61  Results from Seller's work appear to be the origin for the "48 hour rule" (down time 
or time to be away from pigs before making contact with the next group of pigs) used by 
many producers even though different viruses and bacteria may be harbored for longer or 
shorter periods by humans.46  Goodwin and others (1985) could not recover Mycoplasma 
hyopneumoniae from the breath or hair of exposed personnel, but could recover the organism 
from clothing over a 24–48 hour period post-infection.10  However, recent work by Amass 
and Batista  appear to refute these results, indicating shorter recovery times of FMDV from 
people and the inability of personnel to spread Mycoplasma hyopneumoniae from infected to 
naïve herds, despite multiple attempts over extended periods of time.62,63  Recent reports by 
Otake and Alvarez demonstrated the inability of personnel to harbor or transmit PRRSV and 
TGEV, respectively, following completion of basic sanitation protocols.64,65 The former 
study demonstrated that if PRRSV was to be detected on personnel, it was only present on 
the palms of the hands.  In 2009 the pandemic novel H1N1 virus was documented in Canada 
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to have been transmitted from human to pigs.66  This incident help remind everyone that 
down times are important for zoonotic purposes; and therefore, company policies need to be 
flexible to allow employees to stay home when they are sick without concerns of losing their 
job.   
Having a visitor log is important in helping keep track of people traffic on site as well 
as making sure visitors and repair personnel sign off on how long it has been since they have 
had contact with pigs.  Having people sign a sheet helps emphasize the importance of your 
operation’s BRM program. 
Presumably, showering and hand washing both remove contamination,64,62 but 
showering appears to do a better job.67 Hand washing lowers the dose of pathogen but might 
not lower the dose sufficiently to prevent pathogen transmission.  No set time is 
recommended for hand washing or showering because the time needed will depend on the 
extent of contamination.  A good rule of thumb is to wash until you do not see any visible 
contamination.  The efficacy of medicated soap varies according bacterial type.68  Alcohols 
are not effective on visibly contaminated hands.69  Wearing gloves can decrease the gross 
contamination of hands but does not remove the need for hand washing.41 
Showers for employees and visitors can be laid out in a variety of ways.  In most 
cases, the shower is placed at the only entrance into the building so the shower facility cannot 
be bypassed.  The employee may pass through a door to an area where they will undress, 
leaving their clothes and jewelry in a designated area.  This street side is considered the dirty 
side.  The employee would then step into the shower.  The employee must shower, washing 
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body and hair.  After showering, the employee steps into the next room which has clean 
undergarments, coveralls, and boots.  This barn side is called the clean side.  If at any time 
the employee needs to return to the dirty side, they must take another shower before returning 
to the clean side.  Some of the shower layouts have curtains or doors with or without locks.  
Employees’ privacy needs to be considered when designing what will work for each 
production unit.  Unfortunately, due to the nature of human beings to take shortcuts, showers 
can be viewed as a nuisance, resulting in personnel skipping the showering process 
completely or partaking in a cursory rinsing. 
Operations with shower facilities also need to have washers and dryers on site.  Being 
able to do laundry on site ensures that clean apparel will be available, minimizes the tracking 
of contaminated clothing off-site, and prevents bringing items from off-site into the 
operation.  Preventing the contamination of off-site premises is very important especially 
from a public health standpoint.  It is best to leave all contaminated clothing at the site to 
minimize taking any pathogens home where others, including children, could be exposed to 
zoonotic pathogens. 
However, a newly recognized weakness, particularly in cold climates, is the anteroom 
area, located just prior to the entry of the actual shower facility.51  The anteroom is the 
section of the farm encountered immediately upon entry through the main door.  Here, boots 
and coats are removed and stored throughout the day.  Work by Dee et al (2002) indicated 
that the anteroom floor could serve as a site of PRRSV survival and a contamination point for 
shipping parcels that frequently enter swine farms, including styrofoam semen coolers, 
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toolboxes, cardboard containers for pharmaceutical shipments, and lunch pails.51  While the 
frequency of parcel contamination was significantly higher during cold weather versus warm 
weather, these studies emphasized the need for biosecurity protocols to focus upon the 
anteroom area throughout the year. 
One other method that can be used to minimize disease introduction/spread without 
using a shower (or in addition to a shower as an extra BRM practice) is utilizing the so called 
“Danish system or boot exchange.”   In this system, a solid bench is built to create a physical 
separation between two sides of a room.  As a person enters the room from the dirty side, 
they will then sit on the bench, remove their footwear and street clothing and then swing their 
legs over the bench to the opposite side (clean side) where they can now put on clean 
coveralls and boots provided by the farm.  The person will then exit the building though a 
door on the opposite side from where he/she entered.  This bench serves as a physical barrier 
that will prevent the accidental stepping over into the clean side.   
Another area of concern identified by these studies was the infamous “pass-through 
window”, the sliding pane of glass that separates the office area (clean area) from the 
anteroom (contaminated area).  This so-called “barrier” is frequently abused, being left open, 
allowing for shaking hands of visitors with farm personnel and for the introduction of 
containers that have set on the potentially contaminated anteroom floor.   
Employees who remain on site during their workday need to be provided with a 
designated kitchen area.  Disease can be brought onto a site in meat products if those 
products are carried into the production units.  This risk is minimized if employees have an 
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area where they can eat lunch away from the buildings, so that food is not carried into one of 
the production units.  For example, classical swine fever and FMD can be transmitted in 
improperly cooked meat products such as sausage.  If contaminated product were carried into 
a production unit and the pigs consumed scraps, the pigs could become exposed to classical 
swine fever.  Granted while this type of scenario is a little less likely than other disease 
introductions, it is possible and would have a devastating impact.  Changes in trade policy 
that permit importation of animal products from designated regions of countries with FMD 
could increase the chance of inadvertent introduction of the virus, and the threats of 
agroterrorism that include the release of exotic animal diseases increase the chance of 
intentional introduction of FMD into the U.S.70,71 
Limiting farm access to essential personnel is one method of controlling human 
contact.  Security measures such as perimeter fencing and monitored entrances can also be 
used to prevent unauthorized access of people to your farm.41 It is also helpful to have all 
doors on site locked.  This added security will prevent accidental entry by an unauthorized 
individual.  It also serves as a deterrent for those who are looking for a quick way to get in 
and out of a place. 
Many operations will also restrict employees from owning or working with other 
pigs.  This practice helps ensure that accidental cross contamination from one group of pigs 
to the other is minimized.  This is especially important because many times when animals 
first pick up a disease, they may be shedding the organisms for some time before they 
actually show clinical signs of illness.  So simply agreeing to stay away from sick hogs will 
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not be sufficient.  
Some operations also restrict employees from living with other individuals that may 
work with pigs from a different company.  The concern is that by having different people 
from different swine operations share a common living space, cross contamination can occur 
possibly putting both operations at risk.  This could be a risk, but currently there is no science 
to support this.  As long as employees do not bring home any contaminated clothing or boots, 
the risk is truly non-existent.  The risk of zoonotic transmission from pigs to humans then to 
another human and then back to pigs although theoretically possible is also highly unlikely 
and has not been ever reported to date.  There are many other BRM practices (especially 
shower in and shower out practices) to be implemented on farm, which are closer to the pigs, 
to mitigate this particular risk more effectively. 
One other important BRM tool related to employees has to do with human food.  As 
discussed under the garbage feeding section, human food especially imported cured meats 
can pose a risk for swine disease transmission.  In the case of imported products, there is 
concern regarding diseases such as African swine fever, CSF and FMD.  Because of this, it is 
important to have strict rules that prohibit employees from eating in any area where pigs can 
accidentally get access to these foods.  In some operations, all meat products are prohibited 
in the buildings and are allowed only in office areas that are located away from animal 
premises.  Some human food for employees contained in cans has been fogged in the same 
way other products are as they are brought onto the site.  Another method utilized is to 
double bag the lunch so the outside bag can be removed in the entry room while someone on 
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the clean side removes the inside bag to carry into the break room. 
Visitors 
Employees are not the only people entering a production site during the day.  Many 
visitors frequently enter production sites.  These visitors may prove to be someone of very 
low risk of carrying a pathogen; however, they may also be carrying a new strain of PRRSV 
for example.  Entry should always be limited to essential personnel only. 
According to the USDA’s National Animal Health Monitoring System (NAHMS) 
report, about 80 percent of sites in 2006 did not allow anyone except employees to come in 
contact with areas where swine were housed, compared to about 65 percent of sites in 2000.72  
As mentioned previously, a California study did show large swine farms as having some 807 
indirect contacts with pigs per month with 95% of these occurring through people.73 
The Ohio State University Extension published a Factsheet titled, “On-Farm 
Biosecurity: Traffic Control and Sanitation” 74 in which visitors were divided into three 
different categories including low-risk, moderate-risk, and high risk visitors.  The level of 
risk depends on the possibility of exposure to other animals, especially swine, the frequency 
in which they visit farms, and the type of contact they have with animals.  Low-risk visitors 
are those who come from urban areas or others who don’t have any livestock contact.  This 
group of people has minimal risk of introducing disease into the farm.  Moderate-risk visitors 
would be those that have little or no contact with animals but routinely visit farms.  
Salesmen, repair people, feed and fuel delivery people are examples.  This group does 
present a moderate risk of disease introduction.  Finally, high-risk visitors would include 
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anyone who is in direct contact with animals and their bodily secretions/excretions.  This 
group would include livestock haulers, livestock-owning neighbors, processing crews, and 
veterinarians.  This last group does pose a higher risk for disease introduction.   
In all cases, providing a shower facility along with requiring a complete change in 
boots and coveralls (preferably provided by your own site) will dramatically decrease the 
probability that an accidental introduction will occur.  Visitors should be restricted from 
entering pens or having direct contact with animals unless necessary.  Providing gloves as an 
added safety measure can also be beneficial.  All equipment and tools brought in by visitors 
should be cleaned and disinfected as discussed in the fomite section previously.  This 
includes tools brought in for maintenance by outside contractors/servicemen. 
International Visitors or U.S. Citizens Traveling Abroad 
On type of visitor that has not been addressed is the visitor from a foreign country or 
U.S. citizen who has recently traveled abroad.  The risk that this type of visitor could pose 
would depend on a number of factors including the following:   the diseases present in their 
country or the country they were visiting, if they visited any livestock production sites, if 
they came in direct contact with any animals, and if they entered the U.S. with any clothing 
they wore on those sites.  For example, a visitor from China who lives in a large city and 
never has had contact with livestock would pose a low risk even though the country they 
come from has classical swine fever.  In this case, they have never come in contact with pigs.  
However, a U.S. citizen who visits a hog production site in Brazil and then returns to the U.S. 
would pose a much greater risk.  In most cases, the U.S. citizen would bring their own 
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clothes back home and potentially carry disease into the U.S. 
Human diseases in foreign countries need to be considered also when determining the 
precautions necessary when allowing foreign visitors.  The 2009 pandemic influenza 
situation reminded many production units to go to greater lengths to protect their pigs from 
zoonotic diseases.  According to their website, the National Pork Board recommends that if 
entry of a foreign visitor is essential, consider requiring that these people use face masks, or 
preferably properly fitted, valveless N95 respirators, and gloves, upon entering and while 
inside a swine housing facility.  The bottom line is to understand the background of the 
visitors entering your production unit and react accordingly. 
The National Pork Board distributed a pamphlet titled “Are you hosting international 
visitors to your farm?” reminding producers of precautionary measures to take when hosting 
an international visitor.75  The following points were included in the pamphlet: 
x Did you know that many swine viruses can survive on clothing, 
footwear or equipment for weeks and in some cases months? 
x Supply a complete set of coveralls, hairnet and boots.  If they are 
disposable, immediately collect them in a plastic bag and incinerate them.  If they are 
not disposable, immediately wash them in a solution of chlorine bleach (30 ml of 
bleach to 1 gallon of water) or other disinfectant. 
x Do not allow cameras, equipment, food items or other items that 
cannot be properly disinfected into areas where livestock are present. 
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x Visitors should have had no contact with livestock for at least 48 hours 
prior to visiting your pork production site.  If visitors are from a Foot-and-Mouth 
Disease infected country they should have no contact with livestock for at least 5 days 
prior to visiting. 
x Utilize shower in / shower out, if possible. 
x Supply a dust mask for all visitors to wear.  The mask should be tight 
fitting and have two straps to secure it over the mouth and nose. 
x All visitors should completely wash their hands, including scrubbing 
fingernails, with a disinfectant soap prior to entering the farm and again before 
exiting. 
x Control the traffic flow and allow visitors only in carefully selected 
areas.  Do not allow them to unnecessarily handle the livestock. 
 
As we continue to learn more about how disease transmission occurs, these 
procedures and the farm policy should continue to be updated to prevent the introduction of a 
disease by international visitors. 
Carcass Disposal 
Unfortunately, even the most productive sites need to dispose of dead pigs.  However, 
the method to dispose of these animals and the biosecurity precautions taken may determine 
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if the production site exposes themselves to a pathogen from the outside or spreads disease 
internally.  Farms can choose between on-farm disposal techniques and off-farm carcass 
disposal.  Either choice has its benefits and risks; therefore, each production site needs to 
determine which technique can be managed better at their site.  Again this is the focus of a 
BRM. 
It has been estimated that a 1,000 sow farrow-to-finish operation with annual 
mortalities of  7% in the sow herd, 10 % pre-weaning, 5% nursery, and 2% finishing will 
produce approximately 85 dead pigs a week.76  Disposing of all these animals in an 
appropriate, timely, biosecure, and environmentally correct way requires some planning.   
On-farm disposal techniques may include burial, incinerations, and composting.  The 
major advantage of an on-farm system is biosecurity.  Outside mortality collection trucks are 
not required to visit the farm, nor do farm trucks have to risk contamination when delivering 
mortality carcasses to a rendering plant or central collection site. 
Burial was used extensively when operations were smaller because it was an 
inexpensive and efficient method of mortality disposal.  Due to today’s larger size operations 
as well as environmental concerns, many states limit the number of animals that can be 
buried on a per acre basis, making this practice impractical.  The major disadvantage of 
burial is the possibility of contaminating groundwater, particularly in areas with sandy soils 
and a high water table.  In colder areas it is difficult, if not impossible, to dig trenches when 
the ground is frozen.  Also, predators can uncover carcasses if they are not buried deep 
enough, which is unsightly and increases the risk for the spread of diseases.   
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Incineration has become quite popular in recent years.  In the past, incineration 
generated the most public complaints in the U.S.77 Limited size of the equipment for dealing 
with larger animals (late finishing as well as adults) and limited space to deal with sporadic 
high mortality problems are of major concerns with most operations.  Incineration eliminates 
all pathogens but high operational costs and incineration's potential to contribute to air 
pollution (if not properly maintained and operated) decreases its usefulness for widespread 
use as a mortality carcass disposal option. 
Composting uses organic by-products such as dead pigs, straw, or sawdust and 
converts them into an odorless, inoffensive, generally pathogen-free product that can be used 
as a soil amendment or organic fertilizer.  Composting pigs has gained a lot of popularity in 
the past few years due to its lower operational costs and better environmental sustainability.  
There are a lot of great resources available for properly building and maintaining a successful 
composting pile.  Composting does work even in cold areas, although it is slower, but it does 
require proper management to be successful.76  Under normal circumstances, if proper 
composting practices are used, rodent and scavenger activity will not be a problem.  It is 
always good though to take additional steps to minimize any possible rodent or scavenger 
activity.  See the next section on vectors.  In areas with large amount of wildlife, fencing off 
the compost pile area might be necessary to create an additional separation between the 
operation and wildlife. 
 Rendering and landfill are the two main opportunities for off-farm carcass disposal.78 
To use a rendering service, farm personnel should deliver dead pigs to an off-site point where 
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the renderer can pick them up.  Be sure rodents and other animals do not have access to the 
dead pigs.34 
Landfill opportunities are rapidly decreasing as municipal authorities refuse to accept 
carcasses.  With landfill tipping fees of $10-50 per ton, costs are becoming prohibitive in 
areas that still allow this practice.  Landfills are most often used when death losses exceed 
everyday disposal capacity or under disaster situations.  For producers with access to a 
protein recovery plant, rendering has been, and will continue to be, the best means for 
converting swine carcasses into a nutritionally valuable and biologically safe protein by-
product meal.  Unfortunately, the number of rendering facilities operating in the U.S. is 
decreasing, especially among small local plants that accept mortality carcasses.  Many 
rendering plants have closed because of more stringent EPA regulatory action and/or because 
of the depressed world prices for fat, protein, and hides.78 As a consequence, the remaining 
plants are further apart making it cost-prohibitive to transport carcasses to these locations for 
disposal, leaving on-farm composting as the primary new means to dispose of carcasses. 
Biosecurity guidelines need to be respected with either on-farm or off-farm carcass 
disposal.  Because carcasses can serve as a reservoir for disease, they should be disposed of 
daily.  Employees need to be cautious in their work duties not to dispose of the carcass on-
site then track back into any groups of pigs.  Care must also be taken when delivering 
carcasses to an off-site point (preferably some type of dead box located off site) so as not to 
track back into the herd.  Options for the employee may be to dispose of carcasses on-site or 
haul the carcasses to the off-site location at the end of the day and not re-enter the production 
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until the following day.  If employees need to re-enter, they need to follow the set protocol 
which may include showering, changing coveralls and boots, or hand washing as if they were 
entering for the first time that day.   
Vectors 
Rodents, feral animals, pets, birds and even insects can be sources of pathogens for 
pigs.  The disease that each of these vectors transmits varies as may the route in which 
transmission occurs. 
Rodents 
When rodent infestations are not diligently managed they quickly become severe, 
which, in turn, can pose significant economic problems to a swine producer.  Rodents 
consume and contaminate feed, gnaw on structural, mechanical, electrical and various utility 
components, and weaken concrete slabs and walkways via their burrowing activities.  
Norway rats and large populations of mice are particularly destructive to building insulation.  
Rodents can also play a significant role in the maintenance and transmission of swine 
diseases such as leptospirosis, trichinosis, toxoplasmosis, erysipelas, swine dysentery, and 
others.  Mice and rats can spread or accelerate the spread of established diseases from 
contaminated areas to uncontaminated areas via their droppings, feet, fur, urine, saliva, or 
blood.  As an example, mice may travel through infected manure and then contaminate the 
food and water of healthy animals several hundred feet away, or introduce a disease to 
nearby uninfected barns.  Consequently biosecurity cannot be assured if rodents are tolerated 
in or around swine facilities.79
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Rodents have been implicated in the transmission of many disease agents including 
pseudorabies, Bordetella (atrophic rhinitis), encephalomyocarditis virus, leptospirosis, 
Salmonella, swine dysentery, Toxoplasma, and Trichinella.80,79  Facility sanitation plays a 
critical role in controlling rodent populations.  It is obviously impractical to eliminate all 
food sources for rodents in and around swine facilities.  Still, feed spills, or equipment 
malfunctions that provide rodents with unlimited amounts of food should be removed or 
repaired as soon as possible.  Easily accessible harborage is also one of the key elements that 
allows for rodent explosions.  Any exterior debris such as old equipment, junk piles, old 
boards, and the like should be eliminated.  Controlling weeds is also important.  Weeds 
provide rodents with food, water, nesting material, and cover from predators.  By 
maintaining an uncluttered 3-foot weed-free graveled perimeter around buildings, rodents 
cannot use these areas.  Gravel should be at least 1 in.  in diameter and be laid in a band at 
least 3 ft.  wide and 1/2 ft.  deep.79 Rats and mice can be eliminated or severely reduced in 
numbers by using poison baits (rodenticides) and /or rodent traps.  In the majority of cases 
involving established infestations, rodenticide baits strategically placed based on the results 
of the rodent inspections will provide the most cost effective control.79 
The three keys to effective control using rodent baits are:79  
1. Installing fresh baits in the rodent's high activity areas as determined from the 
inspections and/or rodent signs (droppings, gnaw marks, etc.);  
2. Placing out enough bait points to ensure the rodents readily encounter the 
baits during their nightly travels to gather food;  
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3. Matching the right bait formulation (e.g., pellets, vs.  blocks, vs.  packets, etc.) 
to the specific area needing to be baited.  A casual approach of putting out 
baits in corners of barns and buildings, or simply stuffing rodent bait packets 
down rat burrows will have little long term effect on rodent population 
reduction, regardless of the bait brand used.   
To treat exterior rat burrows in a cost effective and safe manner, loose bait pellets can 
be inserted directly into the burrow, or permanent bait stations containing blocks, packets or 
loose pellets can be established nearby the burrows.  Stuffing bait packets or blocks down 
burrows and caving in the burrow is often inefficient and sometimes hazardous because rats 
often kick out some, or all of the baits applied in this manner.  Rejected baits on top of the 
ground the next morning, may be found by dogs, cats, wildlife and even inquisitive 
children.79 
For minor infestations of rats and mice, or to stem off an infestation from new 
incoming rats or mice, the use of traps, placed strategically where rodents have been noticed 
is very effective, and inexpensive.  But traps are too labor intensive for anything beyond a 
minor infestation.79 
Feral Swine 
Feral swine, while abundant in the southeastern U.S., Texas, and California, have 
become more widely distributed in the U.S. in recent years.  The USDA currently estimates 
the current feral swine population to be around 3-5 million and are established in at least 32 
states.  These increases in distribution have resulted in increased risks for transmission of 
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disease agents between feral swine and commercial and transitional swine.  Furthermore, the 
association of feral swine with commercial and transitional swine also presents a risk for 
transmission of foreign animal diseases.67 Modern swine confinement buildings have been 
quite successful in minimizing exposure of domestic hogs to wild hogs.  Having a perimeter 
fence can also be helpful in preventing wildlife coming too close to your facilities.  However, 
when feral swine do come in contact with commercial swine, producers should call their 
veterinarian who can contact USDA APHIS Wildlife Services.  Surveillance for PRV and 
brucellosis is routinely performed on feral swine. 
Pets 
Dogs can spread swine dysentery and brucellosis pathogens.  Dogs have been shown 
to harbor TGE for up to 14 days and Brachyspira hyodysenteriae for up to 13 days.52  Cats 
are a potential source of Pasteurella, leptospirosis and toxoplasmosis to pigs.  Although 
some producers feel that cats can serve as a good rodent control program, if you do the 
simple math, it is difficult for them to eat that many mice.  Dogs and cats can keep rodents 
out of sight, but the rodents are not necessarily gone.  The risks of disease transmission from 
pets to pigs are probably much greater than the benefits in regards to rodent control. 
Birds 
Natural transmission of swine pathogens from birds to pigs has not been 
demonstrated.  However, it has been determined that birds can carry Bordetella and 
tuberculosis.  There is also evidence that birds can transmit the viruses that cause classical 
swine fever, PRRSV, IAV, and TGE to swine.35 Birds can transmit TGE (36 hour survival 
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and 25 mile range) and can carry erysipelas and Salmonella.52 All buildings need to be bird 
proof to prevent direct contact of pigs with any birds. 
Insects 
In some cases, insects can serve as a biosecurity risk.  Houseflies may contribute to 
horizontal transmission of PRRSV among pigs within infected commercial farms.81  Flies 
(Musca domestica) will travel distances of up to 2 miles and can transmit S.  suis serovar 2 
(2-5 days in the crop), Brachyspira hyodysenteriae (4 hours) and TGEV (3 days), and may 
potentially transmit Salmonella, Actinobacillus pleuropneumoniae, and Pasteurella.52  
However, mosquitoes and stable flies (Stomoxys calcitrans) are not likely to serve as 
biological vectors of PRRSV.82,83 
Integrated pest management is an effective way to manage fly populations.  
Monitoring should begin before fly season and continue every two weeks throughout the 
season.  Cleaning up spilled feed, removing feces from pens and alleyways, spraying around 
facilities and keeping grass mowed are all environmental control methods to reduce fly 
populations.  Fly bites on animals should also be treated.  The easiest way to control 
mosquito populations is to control populations at the egg stage by removing breeding 
grounds.  Mosquito control can also center on larvae and adult populations as well.  Insect 
screens can be very effective in facilities to minimize exposure to outside insects.32  
Zoonotic  
Zoonotic diseases are pathogens which are naturally transmissible from animals to 
humans.  In pigs, these zoonotic pathogens can be divided into foodborne pathogens and 
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occupational pathogens.84  Foodborne pathogens from pork mainly include Salmonella,
Yersinia, Toxoplasma, and Campylobacter.  Influenza A virus, Streptococcus suis, 
brucellosis, colibacillosis, campylobacteriosis, erysipelas, and leptospirosis are all examples 
of diseases which could be spread to employees while they handle or care for their pigs.  
Therefore, these pathogens could be categorized as occupational zoonoses.  A few pathogens 
have the potential to cause both foodborne and occupational zoonosis.  For many of these 
pathogens, prevention of human infection is the same as with pigs - focus on hygiene.  
Employers need to make sure employees have access to hand washing stations, and personnel 
protective equipment (gloves, coveralls, N95 masks, etc.) is properly stocked and functional.  
Employees should be informed about zoonotic diseases and prevention techniques which 
they should implement.  Practicing several specific simple hygiene steps can prevent 
infections in employees.   
Steps to prevent disease transmission from pigs to man:85 
1. Wear gloves whenever caring for pigs, handling their wastes (feces, 
urine and dirty bedding), or handling any body product such as: blood, meat, viscera, 
nasal discharges, or fluids draining from wounds.  After removing your gloves, wash 
your hands with soap and water. 
2. Never eat or drink in areas where pigs, their wastes, or body products 
are handled.  Absolutely no eating, drinking, or smoking is allowed in areas where 
pigs are housed. 
3.  Report concerns over sick pigs to your veterinarian, so the 
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veterinarian may determine the cause of the illness and implement any additional 
protective steps.  When the veterinarian does post signs, telling everyone to wear 
special, protective clothing such as masks, gowns, rubber boots or shoe covers, be 
sure to follow these procedures.  If you don't, you increase your chances of getting 
sick, but also, you may expose other people by transmitting the disease pathogen on 
your clothes or hands! 
4.  Although a normal, healthy adult person may have only mild 
symptoms when they become infected with a zoonotic disease, that person may 
spread the disease to others.  Cases of animal handlers "carrying home" zoonotic 
diseases to their infants, with serious consequences can occur.  Therefore, good 
hygiene is not only to protect the person working directly with pigs, but all persons 
with whom they have contact. 
5.  For personnel at the farms, wear a designated pair of shoes and jeans, 
or coveralls, while working at the farm and don't wear these clothes anywhere else! 
Wash the designated clothing separate from the family wash, or have the farm unit do 
the washing to reduce chance of contamination. 
6.  Before leaving the farm, either change to another clean pair of shoes, 
or clean the "farm" shoes before getting into your vehicle.  Use a brush to remove 
manure and mud, then spray with a commercial disinfectant. 
Reporting Suspect Foreign Animal Diseases 
As discussed previously in this document, the U.S. swine industry is at a continuous 
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risk a foreign animal disease (FAD) introduction.  If a producer or veterinarian observes 
clinical signs that could resemble a FAD, call your State Animal Health Official (SAHO) or 
Area Veterinarian-In-Charge (AVIC) to report your concerns.  Contact information for the 
SAHO and the local AVIC can be obtained by calling (866) 536-7593.  You can also call the 
USDA APHIS Veterinary Services National Center for Animal Health Emergency 
Management at (800) 940-6524 (24 hours) for assistance.  The SAHO or AVIC will let you 
know if or approximately when the Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostician (FADD) will 
conduct a site visit.  Precautions to take concerning people movement and contact with 
animals should be discussed while waiting for the FADD to arrive.  They will also want to 
start gathering information from you and the producer.  Discuss the next steps to follow with 
the SAHO or the AVIC you have contacted.  Information will be held confidential to prevent 
unwarranted sharing of information. 
Some of the concerns to be discussed over the phone or when the FADD arrives 
include the following: 
x When were the first lesions evident? 
x When were animals last transported from the farm and what was their 
destination? 
x When were these animals delivered to the farm and where did they 
come from? 
x Does this producer care for other livestock? 
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x How many employees work at this site? 
x Do the employees have livestock at home? 
x Is equipment shared between sites or with neighbors? 
x Does the producer grind his own feed or when was the last delivery of 
feed? 
x Have there been any foreign visitors to the farm? 
x Have any employees recently visited a foreign country? 
x Are employees permitted to consume meat in the livestock buildings? 
 
When the FADD arrives, communication will continue between the FADD, the 
veterinarian, and the producer.  Many questions will need to be answered during the 
investigation.  Be assured that there will be a constant stream of communication to keep 
those involved informed of the procedures and timeframe for sample testing. 
Risk Communication  
Risk communication is a two-way, interactive process that has been occurring 
throughout the risk assessment between the facility owner, risk assessor (veterinarian), the 
employees and other interested parties.  Information has been collected, the analysis has 
occurred, and now information needs to be delivered to those affected by the risk assessment 
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and risk management plan.   
One of the major barriers to effective risk communication is inadequate planning and 
preparation.  Before designing an educational program, it is important to consider who is best 
suited to communicate the message, what message will be most effective, and when and 
where the information should be communicated.   
In large operations, the biological risk management plan may be formulated by upper 
management, and some employees may not understand the importance of the plan.  Risk 
management plans must be understood, supported, and adopted by every employee for 
effective implementation.  Because many employees may not understand disease 
transmission routes and the chain of events involved in disease spread, this communication 
can be difficult and employees may not fully appreciate the significance of the measures they 
are asked to follow.   
Characteristics of effective risk communication:  
x It must be adapted to meet the needs of the audience.  If bilingual 
information is required, make sure it is provided;  
x It should present the important information in more than one way 
(appeal to both visual and auditory learners);  
x Keep sessions focused to a maximum of three main points and 45 
minutes maximum;  
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x Sessions are more valuable if they are timely and the participants can 
apply the new information immediately;  
x Sessions should cover what, when, where, how, by whom, and why;  
x Give participants the opportunity to take ownership of the production 
process and the ramifications of decisions that impact their area.  They should be 
actively engaged in the question at hand so that they share information, and most 
importantly provide input so that decisions become a collective agreement.   
x Schedule meetings earlier in the day.  Meetings at the end of the 
working day are less effective.   
 
Educational programs that inform employees and other affected individuals of the 
risk assessment and management plan can take many forms, and may include:  
x Face to face/group meetings (one of the best communication forms if 
the presenter and participants have open dialogue);  
x Newsletter, fliers or bulletin;  
x Videos, CD’s, PowerPoint presentations or web-based instruction;  
x Posted signs or information panels placed at key locations on the farm 
(break rooms, shower /changing rooms);  
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x Employee questions and suggestions (question/answer board, 
suggestion box, question period during meetings, etc.);  
x Mentoring of new employees by experienced employees;  
x Recognition or incentive program that rewards employees when BRM 
goals are reached (this has been used on some farms focused on farrowing rates, and 
preweaning mortality).   
 
Educational programs should not be limited to one form.  Facility owners may 
incorporate many of the above mentioned education forms to create a program that fits the 
needs of their facility.   
To help the veterinarian facilitate communication, there are handouts about each of 
the routes of transmission with various applicable diseases provided on the Center for Food 
Security and Public Health website (www.cfsph.iastate.edu) to educate producers about the 
risk of zoonotic, endemic and foreign animal diseases.  The reports that can be printed based 
on the answers to the assessment question provide a visual tool to the strengths and 
weaknesses for the various routes of transmission on a swine farm.  The final report graphs 
that are generated are meant as a visual aid to illustrate potential areas of action.  The various 
risk factors identified have not been quantified or prioritized.  It should not be interpreted as 
an arbitrary number which is required for a facility or veterinarian to “pass,” or even that 
comparable scores for two different facilities mean they face equal risk.  The reports should 
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be used to identify if a particular area seems to represent a disproportionate risk and help 
track progress over time through continued assessments.  The management recommendations 
are made to minimize circumstances that could potentially result in the spread of infectious 
diseases.   
Proper communication of the risk management plan is of utmost importance for 
effective infectious disease control.  When communication is effective and efficient, disease 
spread can often be minimized and controlled.  However, few management plans are 
successful if records are not kept or some form of biosecurity audit performed so that 
progress can be measured.  Part of the risk communication process should include helping to 
ensure that a monitoring system is put in place to measure progress. 
Conclusion 
Biological risk management (BRM) is an essential part of all swine operations 
regardless of their size or mode of operation.  Disease risk can never be completely 
eliminated, but BRM is a great approach to minimizing the possibility, as well as the 
consequences, of a new disease introduction or the spread of disease within a farm.  Each 
operation has different strengths and weakness, but while keeping in mind the different 
routes of transmission, you can work with your veterinarian in figuring out the prioritization 
for your particular operation.  Being aware of the different routes of transmission will also 
serve as a reminder that there are more diseases out there than just PRRSV.  A full awareness 
of all risks is critical in mitigating threats of endemic, emerging, and foreign animal diseases.  
Submitting surveillance samples which test for diseases also raises our awareness to a 
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national level.  For example, 14,666 samples were tested for CSF during 2010 as part of the 
CSF Surveillance Program.  Testing included samples from both domestic and feral swine 
(personal communication).  Surveillance of the U.S. swine herd is just as important as 
surveillance performed on the farm.  While surveillance will help to identify a disease 
affecting one or more herds, practicing good BRM will give each producer the best chance of 
keeping that disease out of their herd.  As we continue to learn about transmission routes of 
diseases, the BRM practices on each operation will need to be adjusted.  The BRM is a 
working document that needs to be adjusted as new information is provided. 
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CHAPTER 6. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
Data from my influenza study suggests that swine confinement workers are at 
increased risk for zoonotic influenza infection.  Our sample size was small and was restricted 
to a small population which most likely does not represent all swine workers.  The serologic 
tests we used have not been validated, but they serve as a guide for future research in this 
area.  I believe my data was the first evidence that smoking also increases the risk of IAV 
even more for swine workers.  At least in Iowa, this is becoming less of an issue today as 
new state laws restrict smoking in the workplace.  Probably even more important from a 
practical standpoint is the evidence that suggests the use of gloves during swine confinement 
work noticeably decreases the risk of swine influenza virus infection.  Thus a rather simple 
personal protective measure might do much to reduce potential zoonotic infection 
transmission.  Worker education along with access to properly stocked hand washing stations 
is critical in helping mitigate possible public health concerns. 
As the U.S. swine industry participates in the new Influenza Virus Surveillance in 
Pigs program hopefully we will have a better understanding of the disease and pathogen 
ecology.  This is critical as it will provide us a better understanding of IAV transmission 
especially within a herd.  This better understanding can then help us plan for better 
monitoring as well as specific timing and areas where interventions can be instituted to 
mitigate the transmission and effects of IAV between pigs as well as between people and 
pigs and pigs and people.  By having veterinary and swine industry involvement in this 
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research we can be better assured the right decisions are being made for all involved (pigs, 
people, and industry). 
As we addressed the possibilities of zoonotic disease transmission in this first paper 
we also needed to focus on disease transmission between pigs.  For this part, currently the 
number one disease agent of concern in the swine industry is porcine reproductive and 
respiratory syndrome virus (PRRSV).  This is a disease that has been affecting the industry 
for over 22 years and we still have not figure out how to best prevent transmission between 
pigs.  We are fortunate this disease is not zoonotic so we can focus our concerns strictly on 
pigs. 
To mitigate PRRSV disease transmission we need to better understand viral 
transmission especially within a herd.  There has been quite a bit of information working on 
the breeding herd, but limited data has been available regarding the wean through finishing 
period.  Data from this study supports PRRSV as not being a highly contagious virus 
(contagious was defined in our study as having a short time to seroconversion) and goes even 
further to quantify the rate of transmission. Overall our data suggest it took just over 5 weeks 
(39 days, 95% CI 35.3 to 43.2) for all pigs in a cohort of 20 to seroconvert.  This is quite an 
impressive number, and short confidence interval, considering all cohorts housed the 20 pigs 
together in a single pen so contact time between pigs was frequent. 
The most significant risk factor identified by our study contributing to a quicker time-
to-seroconversion (defined as the hazard) was the pig’s PRRSV polymerase chain reaction 
(PCR) result at enrollment.  Being PRRSV PCR positive at enrollment had a HR=34.00 
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(95%CI, 8.06 to 143.44).  Besides the individual pig itself being viremic, for every PCR 
positive pig in the cohort at enrollment time the HR of 1.66 (95%CI, 1.23 to 2.23) would 
increase exponentially.  So having three more pigs would provide a mean HR of 1.663 or 
4.57.  The effect of both of these variables decreased over time. 
Obviously this was expected and makes biological sense.  What our data does is 
confirm that this is true as well as provide supporting evidence that being a small pig within a 
group or having a high or low PPRSV ELISA at enrollment was not a good predictor for the 
pig’s PRRSV PCR status at that time.  Unfortunately many in the industry still look at pig 
size as being a “disease.”  This was propagated even more with the reported work by Cano et 
al in which smallest male piglets are purposely being selected for PRRV PCR monitoring of 
the sow herd.  Their study as well as our study suggests that weaning time pig size is not 
correlated with viremia. 
Our data also showed that the low contagiousness of the PRRSV is creating an 
environment of rising and lowering antibody titers over time.  This is significant as serologic 
homogeneity was dynamic and difficult to achieve in such a small cohort with constant 
exposure to each other.  It is challenging to even think about the dynamics in a large sow 
population. 
Things are complicated enough when looking at a single agent like PRRSV but in 
reality animals are exposed to more than one pathogen over time.  In our oral fluid 
surveillance study, we identified that of 600 samples collected overall, 508 (85%) samples 
were positive for PCV2, 73 (12%) for PRRSV, 46 (8%) for IAV, 483 (81%) for Torque teno 
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genogroup 2 (TTV2), and 155 (26%) for TTV1.  There were only 15 (3%) samples that 
tested negative for all 5 agents.  Repeated sampling over time showed that a variety of 
pathogens circulate both intermittently and continuously in pig population.  We also found 
that barn “health” is highly variable, even among barns in the same production system.  It 
was also interesting to find that PCV2 shedding occurs throughout the entire growing period 
of the pig even in these barns with pigs that had been vaccinated.  Again it is not a matter of 
is it there or not, trying to quantify how much is there as well as what else is there at the same 
time is critical in allowing us to make better decisions that hopefully will maximize pig 
health. 
In our study, when analyzing the different pathogens for their association with 
mortality (time-to-death) our results varied significantly between the univariate and 
multivariate modeling supporting the idea that we must look at things from a multi-agent 
interaction perspective rather than a single agent at a time.  The univariate analysis identified 
statistically significant hazard ratios (HR) for TTV1 (HR = 1.089; p = 0.0217) and IAV (HR 
= 1.160; p < 0.0001) with PRRSV (HR = 1.075; p = 0.0522) being close to statistically 
significant.  Multivariate hazard ratios for TTV2 (HR = 0.805; p = 0.0075) and IAV (HR = 
1.203; p < 0.0001) were the only two identified as statistically significant.  
Our “proof-of-concept” study also provides a look at a simple, practical, and cost 
effective means to collect more timely data more often.  Many assays are still being refined 
and validated for use with oral fluids, but the future is looking promising especially as we 
can introduce selective antibody class detection (IgM vs IgG vs IgA). 
183 
 
 
 
The facility of multi-agent, multi-farm, oral fluid data collection over time will result 
in large, complex datasets.  This development will mandate better training in more 
sophisticated statistical and analytical methods.  We have the tool, now we need to get our 
knowledge caught up.  The use of data, whether collected by farm personnel or a 
veterinarian, does not eliminate the need for veterinarians to “walk the barns”.  Clinical skills 
and the powers of observation will continue to remain important tools in the armamentarium.   
The last chapter of this dissertation focuses on biological risk management (BRM).  
The term BRM has been specifically selected rather than simply biosecurity.  Biosecurity 
implies a yes or no approach to things whereas BRM takes the approach that it is all a matter 
of managing risk as most risks cannot be totally eliminated.  For many thesis and 
dissertations, the literature review serves as a way to be “introduced” into a topic.  It lays the 
foundation for the studies to follow.  In this case, my literature review work will serve as a 
guide on how to work to prevent disease transmission (animal-to-animal as well as animal-
to-human and human-to-animal) in the swine industry.  It is a comprehensive document that 
tries to move away from specific pathogens and focus on disease transmission (focus of this 
dissertation) from the perspective of routes.  This is important because once again, many 
times we are focused on only one pathogen and ignore many others.  This is especially true 
when looking at a new or re-emerging disease as well as a foreign animal disease (FAD).  
Focusing on routes of transmission is the core to all BRM practices. 
If one is to fully focus on BRM, then why do we need to research pathogen 
transmission?  The key is that we have limited resources and time (personnel) thus the 
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approach to BRM is to focus on the greater risks first.  For example, one needs to evaluate 
the risk for disease transmission from re-using needles for injections (fomites) compared to 
installing a complex and expensive air filtration system (aerosol).  The ultimate goal is to 
maximize our investment in time and money through better health. 
This dissertation has been focused on swine pathogen transmission.  We need to be 
able to recognize pathogens of concern, identify their significance, develop monitoring plans 
so that the effect of our interventions can be better quantified.   The key to success lies in 
science based Preventive Veterinary medicine. 
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